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When Hawaii seemed poised to be the first state of the Un-
ion to permit same-sex marriage in the 1990s, Congress passed 
the so-called Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).1 The Act had 
 
 1. The Hawaii Supreme Court ruled in 1993 that denying marriage li-
censes to gays violated the Hawaii Constitution. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 
44, 59–67 (Haw. 1993). Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996, 
but in 1998, voters in Hawaii adopted a constitutional amendment that effec-
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two parts. One provided a definition of marriage for purposes of 
federal law that excluded same-sex unions.2 The second part 
was a choice-of-law provision that provided that states were not 
required to recognize same-sex marriages performed in sister 
states or judgments in connection with such marriages.3 
Though many scholars have argued that DOMA exceeded Con-
gress’s powers,4 controversies concerning DOMA’s provisions 
have not yet appeared in the courts because Hawaii did not ul-
timately legalize same-sex marriage. 
Claims of DOMA’s unconstitutionality recently have inten-
sified following the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lawrence v. 
Texas, which struck down as unconstitutional state laws that 
criminalized sodomy.5 Moreover, now that Massachusetts has 
become the first jurisdiction within the United States to solem-
nize same-sex marriages,6 the scenarios DOMA sought to ad-
dress certainly will arise. Accordingly, this is an opportune 
time to revisit the question of DOMA’s constitutionality. 
This Article’s thesis is that DOMA is not unconstitu-
tional—at least not yet. There are two components to the 
analysis. The first is a demonstration that Lawrence has not 
invalidated DOMA. The second component is an explanation as 
to why DOMA was not otherwise beyond Congress’s powers 
even before Lawrence. 
 
 
tively overturned the Hawaii Supreme Court’s opinion. See Note, Litigating 
the Defense of Marriage Act: The Next Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 
117 HARV. L. REV. 2684, 2684–85 (2004). 
 2. See Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 3(a), 110 Stat. 
2419 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000)).  
 3. See id. § 2(a) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).  
 4. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of 
Marriage Act Is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1, 14 (1997); Larry Kramer, 
Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy 
Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 2000–07 (1997). 
 5. 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003). 
 6. Gay marriage became legal in Massachusetts on May 17, 2004, in re-
sponse to the decision by Massachusetts’s highest court that the Massachu-
setts Constitution demanded that marriage be available to gays. See Opinions 
of the Justices to the Senate, 809 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004) (concluding 
that the state constitution requires that gays be permitted to marry, not sim-
ply have access to civil unions); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 
941, 968 (Mass. 2003). See generally Associated Press, Gay Couples Exchange 
Vows in Massachusetts, MSNBC NEWS, May 18, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn 
.com/id/4991967 (summarizing the events surrounding and reaction to the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision to let same-sex couples 
marry). 
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Part I of the Article argues that Lawrence has not invali-
dated DOMA. Though Justice Scalia in dissent argued that 
Lawrence’s logic invariably leads to the conclusion that the 
Constitution prohibits government from treating gay marriage 
differently from heterosexual marriage—a proposition that, if 
true, would render DOMA unconstitutional—the Lawrence 
opinion expressly reserved the question of what the Constitu-
tion has to say about same-sex marriage. The Lawrence opinion 
certainly contains analysis that advocates of same-sex mar-
riage can muster on their behalf, but other aspects of the opin-
ion offer grounding for those who take the opposite view.7 
Part I then explains the benefits of allowing a society-wide de-
bate to continue on issues of gay rights and considers the dan-
gers were the Court to prematurely offer a definitive constitu-
tional ruling on an issue about which citizens are deeply 
divided and with respect to which societal norms are rapidly 
changing. 
That Lawrence has not decided the constitutionality of 
same-sex marriage does not mean that DOMA necessarily is 
constitutional. Years before Lawrence was decided, many of our 
country’s finest public law scholars argued that DOMA lies be-
yond Congress’s powers. Parts II, III, and IV of the Article criti-
cally engage these arguments from Dean Larry Kramer, Pro-
fessors Laurence Tribe, Joseph Singer, Andrew Koppelman, 
and others. Of the many critiques the Article dissects, four ar-
guments recur. First, several scholars have proffered Tenth 
Amendment-type claims that DOMA violates state sovereignty 
by interfering with a family law subject that appropriately falls 
to the states. Part II shows that such arguments mischaracter-
ize DOMA: the statute does not regulate family law as such, 
but serves the quintessentially federal function of determining 
the extraterritorial effect of state law. 
Second, many DOMA critics aver that the statute under-
mines the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s fundamental principle 
of unifying the country. Part II of the Article shows that such 
 
 7. Several other noted commentators have come to similar conclusions as 
a matter of positive law. See, e.g., Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the Funda-
mental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. 
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1186 (2004); Katherine M. Franke, The Domes-
ticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2004); 
Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, 
and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 30–31, 36 (2003). For a contrary view, see Jo-
seph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, and the Eva-
sion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 8–9 (2005). 
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arguments rest on a problematic oversimplification of full faith 
and credit—the provision aims not only to unify but to preserve 
meaningfully empowered states. Because DOMA is fully consis-
tent with at least one of the principles of full faith and credit, 
sweeping arguments that DOMA violates fundamental princi-
ples fail. 
Third, virtually all scholarly critiques of DOMA have as-
sumed that the statute purports to authorize states to deviate 
from Supreme Court precedent regarding the enforcement of 
judgments. This has been a predicate to their conclusion that 
Congress overstepped its authority in enacting DOMA. Part II 
shows, however, that DOMA’s rules actually fill a gap in the 
Court’s jurisprudence in a manner fully consistent with prece-
dent. 
Fourth, the Article shows that several apparently dispa-
rate arguments leveled against DOMA turn out to be unargued 
assertions that the Supreme Court has the final say in deter-
mining the scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. To be 
sure, this entire line of argumentation is irrelevant if, as I con-
tend, DOMA fills a gap rather than alters the Supreme Court’s 
baseline rules. But because the view that DOMA alters Su-
preme Court doctrine is so widespread, Part III forthrightly 
analyzes the nature of Congress’s power under the so-called 
“Effects Clause” to determine what full faith and credit re-
quires.8 
Part IV defends DOMA against a novel argument that Pro-
fessor Joseph Singer of Harvard Law School recently ad-
vanced.9 Singer has argued that full faith and credit demands 
that all states recognize a marriage that any sister state sanc-
tions. Part IV shows that Singer’s position is contrary to more 
than two centuries of jurisprudence and calls for the extension 
of a single case that has proven to be deeply problematic. Fur-
ther, the policy concerns that animate Singer’s proposal can be 
addressed by means that do not interfere with state sover-
eignty in the drastic way Singer proposes. Unless and until the 
Court decides (probably and properly under Lawrence-type due 
 
 8. The first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause states that 
“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, 
and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The 
second sentence provides that “the Congress may by general Laws prescribe 
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and 
the Effect thereof.” Id. 
 9. See Singer, supra note 7, at 31–46. 
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process considerations) that states may not refuse to allow 
same-sex couples to marry, the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
should not prevent states from differing on matters about 
which there is no constitutionally required national standard. 
In the end, the Article concludes that DOMA is best under-
stood as an instance of congressional participation in the proc-
ess of defining our country’s constitutional culture. The Court 
has not yet decided the constitutionality of same-sex marriage, 
and DOMA reflects the political branches’ contribution—by 
means of the institutional tools at their disposal—to the proc-
ess of deciding how American constitutional culture should deal 
with the incidents of gay life. 
I.  WHY LAWRENCE HAS NOT RENDERED  
DOMA UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The Lawrence opinion expressly stated that it was not de-
ciding the constitutional status of same-sex marriage.10 Justice 
Scalia disagreed, arguing in dissent that the logic of the major-
ity’s analysis invariably leads to the conclusion that the Consti-
tution requires that marriage be available to gays if it is avail-
able to heterosexuals. The majority opinion, said Justice Scalia, 
dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a 
distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, 
insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral dis-
approbation of homosexual conduct is “no legitimate state inter-
est” . . . what justification could there possibly be for denying the 
benefits of marriage to [gays]? . . . This case “does not involve” the is-
sue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that 
principle and logic have nothing to do with the decisions of this 
Court.11 
If Justice Scalia is correct, it would follow that DOMA—a 
statute providing a federal definition for marriage that ex-
cludes same-sex unions and that purports to authorize states 
not to recognize same-sex marriages from jurisdictions that ac-
cept such marriages—is unconstitutional. 
Is Justice Scalia correct? Has the constitutionality of same-
sex marriage already been decided by the Court? I think not, 
for three principle reasons. 
 
 10. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not . . . involve 
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that 
homosexual persons seek to enter.”). 
 11. Id. at 604–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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A. REASONS INTERNAL TO THE OPINION ITSELF 
The first reason involves considerations wholly internal to 
the opinion itself. In addition to explicitly saying that it did not 
decide the question of same-sex marriage, the majority opinion 
contains principles in tension with one another that would 
yield divergent same-sex marriage outcomes. As Professor 
Robert Post has shown, in declaring Texas’s law unconstitu-
tional, the Court reconfigured due process and equal protection 
concerns into constitutional principles of respect, dignity, and 
antistigma.12 At the same time, however, the Lawrence Court 
preserved the public/private distinction,13 under which regula-
tions targeting private conduct are deemed more intrusive and 
hence more difficult to sustain, as it condemned Texas’s ban on 
sodomy for penalizing sexual relations that occur in private.14 
Although the principles of stigma, respect, and dignity cer-
tainly provide powerful arguments to those who wish to advo-
cate that the Constitution forbids the denial of same-sex mar-
riage,15 marriage is readily characterized as a “public” act and 
accordingly could be argued to lie outside Lawrence’s holding. 
Indeed, the Lawrence Court appears to expressly say as much 
when formulating its “general rule” that government should 
not “define the meaning of the relationship or . . . set its 
boundaries absent . . . abuse of an institution the law pro-
tects.”16 Insofar as the prohibition of same-sex marriage typi-
 
 12. See Post, supra note 7, at 97–101. 
 13. Although the public/private distinction has been subject to searing cri-
tiques over the years for being incoherent, see Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the 
Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171, 199–201 (2004) (surveying such critiques), 
the Court has given no indication that it is ready to abandon it. The analysis 
above in text accordingly accepts the distinction’s continuing validity on posi-
tive grounds. Elsewhere I have defended the public/private distinction on 
normative grounds. See id. at 201–06. 
 14. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case . . . does not 
involve public conduct . . . . The petitioners are entitled to respect for their pri-
vate lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by 
making their private sexual conduct a crime.”); id. at 567 (“[A]dults may 
choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their 
own private lives . . . .”); id. at 578 (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate 
state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life 
of the individual.”). For other academic commentary that notes the Court’s re-
tention of the private/public distinction in the Lawrence opinion, see Franke, 
supra note 7, at 1401–04; and Post, supra note 7, at 101–03. 
 15. For some excellent examples, see Ball, supra note 7, at 1207–31; and 
Note, supra note 1, at 2688–2707. 
 16. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (emphasis added); see Suzanne B. Goldberg, 
Morals-Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before and After Lawrence v. 
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cally is justified on the ground that doing so protects the insti-
tution of marriage,17 this language of the Lawrence opinion in-
vites claims that allowing same-sex marriage would destabilize 
the “institution” of marriage.18 For this reason, pace Justice 
Scalia, the “logic” of the Lawrence opinion is not so unidirec-
tional as to inexorably lead to any single result vis-à-vis same-
sex marriage. 
B. THE UNCERTAIN FUTURE OF LAWRENCE’S NOVEL PRINCIPLES 
A second reason that Lawrence is best understood as not 
deciding the constitutionality of same-sex marriage is that the 
status of several of the opinion’s animating principles is uncer-
tain. This uncertainty arises because several of Lawrence’s core 
constitutional principles are novel, and many novel constitu-
tional principles do not survive. 
Much is new in Lawrence. Professor Post has shown that 
the “[t]hemes of respect and stigma [that] are at the moral cen-
ter of the Lawrence opinion . . . are entirely new to substantive 
due process doctrine.”19 Similarly novel is the doubt Lawrence 
casts on whether the majority’s moral opprobrium is a constitu-
tional basis for criminalizing an activity.20 
The durability of these aspects of Lawrence is uncertain 
simply by virtue of their novelty. Though the Court sometimes 
overturns well-entrenched constitutional principles,21 newly 
 
Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (2004). 
 17. This justification seems particularly unconvincing to me. For an inter-
esting analysis of this claim that largely tracks my own, see Sam Fleischacker, 
Civil Unions for Everyone, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 18, 2004, at A17. 
 18. McGinnis and Lund suggest a similar interpretation of this line of the 
opinion. See Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judi-
cial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1584 & n.102 (2004). 
 19. Post, supra note 7, at 97. 
 20. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571. The Court stated: 
[T]he Court in Bowers was making the broader point that for centu-
ries there have been powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct 
as immoral. . . . For many persons these are not trivial concerns but 
profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral princi-
ples to which they aspire and which thus determine the course of 
their lives. These considerations do not answer the question before us, 
however. The issue is whether the majority may use the power of the 
State to enforce these views on the whole of society through operation 
of the criminal law. “Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not 
to mandate our own moral code.” 
Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 
(1992)); see also Ball, supra note 7, at 1221–22; Goldberg, supra note 16. 
 21. See, e.g., W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 392 (1937) (de-
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minted constitutional principles are more vulnerable because 
the Court can narrow or ignore them without disturbing reams 
of precedent. There are many examples of newly born constitu-
tional principles of apparently broad scope whose development 
has been dramatically limited by subsequent case law. For ex-
ample, although several opinions in the 1960s and 1970s sug-
gested that wealth was a suspect classification triggering strict 
scrutiny under equal protection and due process doctrines,22 
the Court decisively aborted this doctrinal revolution in San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.23 The Court 
quashed this constitutional revolution not because it lacked 
“logic,”24 but more likely because it would have radically re-
worked society,25 potentially reshaping our polity into a near-
socialist system; indeed, the Rodgriguez Court seemed to say as 
much.26 
Consider as well what has become of the state action prin-
ciple the Court famously announced in Shelley v. Kraemer.27 
 
finitively rejecting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
 22. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 242 (1970) (“Here the Illi-
nois statute as applied to Williams works an invidious discrimination solely 
because he is unable to pay the fine.”); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 
383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) (“Lines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like 
those of race . . . are traditionally disfavored.” (internal citation omitted)); 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16–17 (1956) (“Providing equal justice for poor 
and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age-old problem. . . . [O]ur own consti-
tutional guaranties of due process and equal protection both call for proce-
dures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations between per-
sons and different groups of persons.”).  
 23. 411 U.S. 1, 20 (1973) (holding that legislative classifications having a 
disparate impact on rich and poor trigger heightened scrutiny only where “be-
cause of their impecunity [the poor were] completely unable to pay for some 
desired benefit, and as a consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation 
of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy that benefit”). 
 24. The argument that disparities in monies spent on public education 
interfere with the “effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms and [the] 
intelligent utilization of the right to vote,” id. at 35, seems far from illogical. 
 25. Cf. Richard A. Posner, Legal Pragmatism Defended, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
683, 689 (2004) (“A court . . . cannot get too far ahead of public opinion.”). 
 26. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37. The Court noted: 
The logical limitations on appellees’ nexus theory are difficult to per-
ceive. How, for instance, is education to be distinguished from the 
significant personal interests in the basics of decent food and shelter? 
Empirical examination might well buttress an assumption that the 
ill-fed, ill-clothed, and ill-housed are among the most ineffective par-
ticipants in the political process, and that they derive the least en-
joyment from the benefits of the First Amendment. 
Id. 
 27. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
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The Shelley Court attributed the substantive provisions of a 
private contract to the state when the court was asked to en-
force a racially restrictive covenant. Shelley’s approach, “consis-
tently applied, would require individuals to conform their pri-
vate agreements to constitutional standards whenever, as 
almost always, the individuals might later seek the security of 
potential judicial enforcement.”28 Although Shelley’s is not an 
illogical conception of state action,29 Shelley’s principle, virtu-
ally everyone believes, has been limited to the context of race.30 
I have suggested elsewhere that this limitation likely occurred 
because so broadly extending constitutional limitations to pri-
vate action would have reworked our society in ways inconsis-
tent with American cultural sensibilities.31 
In short, wealth classifications and Shelley’s state action 
doctrine are examples of (then) novel constitutional principles 
that became aborted constitutional revolutions. Similarly, to-
day we cannot be certain what will become of the concepts of 
respect and stigma, nor of the limits that Lawrence purports to 
place on the role of moral considerations in criminal law. Each 
of these novel constitutional principles has the potential of sig-
nificantly reworking our society.32 Indeed, it is the recognition 
that Lawrence’s principles could have profound implications on 
American society that has led Professor Post to begin the proc-
ess of locating limitations for the Court’s principle of respect.33 
 
 28. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1697 (2d 
ed. 1988). 
 29. See Rosen, supra note 13, at 200–03. 
 30. See id. at 190–99. In fact, the Supreme Court even has been reluctant 
to apply Shelley in other cases of racial discrimination, but instead has nearly 
confined Shelley to its facts. See Mark D. Rosen, Was Shelley v. Kraemer In-
correctly Decided? Some New Answers 7–10 (Jan. 16, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author).  
 31. See Rosen, supra note 13, at 201–06. 
 32. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (“The law, it is said, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all 
laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the 
Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.” (internal quotation 
omitted)). 
 33. See Post, supra note 7, at 98. Post finds it  
unlikely that Lawrence intends to authorize persons to demand from 
the state affirmative indicia of respect, both because this would im-
pose an unusual positive obligation on the state, and because it is en-
tirely unclear what such indicia might be. It is therefore more plausi-
ble to interpret Lawrence as prohibiting the state from stigmatizing 
or demeaning the private lives of persons. 
Id.  
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Perhaps courts will take up Post’s suggested limitations. Per-
haps others will be created. Or perhaps the principles them-
selves will be left undeveloped. 
To conclude, the uncertain future of the many new consti-
tutional principles identified in Lawrence—an uncertainty gen-
erated by their very novelty—constitutes a second reason why 
the opinion should not be viewed as having answered the con-
stitutionality of same-sex marriage. 
C. THE BENEFITS OF MULTILATERAL PARTICIPATION 
The third reason for not prematurely construing Lawrence 
as having answered the constitutionality of same-sex marriage 
is that doing so eliminates the benefits of multiple actors in so-
ciety offering their views of what the Constitution requires. I 
cannot hope in this Article to demonstrate definitively these 
advantages. But I can suggest that those who agree with the 
many academics from across the political spectrum who advo-
cate that societal institutions apart from the Court play an im-
portant role in shaping constitutional meaning34 should be in-
 
 34. A broad array of scholars from across the political spectrum have 
championed the role of actors apart from the Supreme Court in interpreting 
the Constitution, including John Harrison, Michael Stokes Paulsen, Thomas 
Merrill, Neal Devins, Louis Fisher, Robert Post, Jeremy Waldron, Keith Whit-
tington, Cass Sunstein, Sanford Levinson, and Mark Tushnet. See CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT 24–45 (1999) (recognizing that elected government and citizens prop-
erly play a role in constitutional interpretation); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 181–82 (1999) (advancing the theory 
that the people are proper constitutional interpreters); Neal Devins & Louis 
Fisher, Judicial Exclusivity and Political Instability, 84 VA. L. REV. 83, 98–
104 (1998) (advocating that neither of the other branches of the federal gov-
ernment nor the people should “subjugate their constitutional judgments to 
those of the Supreme Court” (quoting Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, 
On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1382 
(1997))); John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in 
Interpreting the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371, 372–73 (1988) (arguing 
that the legislative and executive branches have the power to offer independ-
ent interpretations); Harold J. Krent, The Supreme Court as an Enforcement 
Agency, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1149, 1188–1201 (1998) (discussing state 
courts as constitutional interpreters); Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right 
This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1071 (1987) (discussing the legislative and execu-
tive branches’ roles in interpreting the Constitution); Thomas W. Merrill, Ju-
dicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 CAR-
DOZO L. REV. 43, 76, 79 (1993) (suggesting that judicial opinions are merely 
“explanations for judgments” and accordingly “lack the power to bind the other 
branches”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive 
Power To Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994) (arguing that the ex-
ecutive branch has the power to offer its own independent interpretation of the 
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clined to take seriously the Court’s statement in Lawrence that 
the decision did not resolve the question of same-sex marriage. 
This is because, as a purely descriptive matter, actors in society 
apart from the Supreme Court are more apt to develop and ad-
vance their own views of what the Constitution requires if the 
Court has not already definitively offered its constitutional rul-
ing on the question.35 
Two benefits of multilateral participation in constitutional 
decision making that commentators have identified are particu-
larly applicable to the context of same-sex marriage.36 
1. Varying Institutional Competencies 
First, courts, like all societal institutions, have their par-
ticular institutional strengths and weaknesses,37 and resolving 
the constitutional dimensions of same-sex marriage may call on 
information that courts are not particularly well suited to gath-
ering and assessing. One of the principal arguments against 
same-sex marriage is the claim that it will endanger the insti-
tution of heterosexual marriage. It is plausible that the answer 
to this question is constitutionally relevant; Lawrence seems to 
say this very thing.38 Yet courts are not institutionally suited to 
 
Constitution); Jeremy Waldron, Judicial Power and Popular Sovereignty, in 
MARBURY VERSUS MADISON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 181 (Mark A. 
Graber & Michael Perhac eds., 2002); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial 
Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 
773 (2002); see also LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 233–48 (2004) (critiquing “judicial 
supremacy” and advocating a return to a form of “popular constitutionalism,” 
under which the Court’s understanding of the Constitution does not necessar-
ily trump society’s constitutional understandings). 
 35. There is evidence that many nonjudicial societal actors by and large 
have accepted the regime of judicial hegemony described in Cooper v. Aaron, 
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of 
the law of the Constitution.”). See Devins & Fisher, supra note 34, at 83–84. 
 36. I believe that deeper considerations regarding the nature of constitu-
tional doctrine provide yet additional reasons to favor multilateral participa-
tion in constitutional decision making. A work-in-progress of mine examines 
these, but space limitations preclude my discussing them here. 
 37. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND THE 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 35–52 (2001) (discussing the strengths and 
limitations of the adjudicative process); Neal Devins, The Democracy-Forcing 
Constitution, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1971, 1978–84, 1990 (1999) (reviewing SUN-
STEIN, supra note 34). 
 38. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (stating that govern-
ment should not “define the meaning of the relationship or . . . set its bounda-
ries absent . . . abuse of an institution the law protects”). 
ROSEN_3FMT 04/18/2006 03:28:45 PM 
2006] DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT 927 
 
fact gathering of this sort.39 The empirical information simply 
might not be available at the time of litigation. This would 
seem to be the case with the effects of same-sex marriage on 
heterosexual marriage, as gay marriage has been legal in the 
United States for only a short period of time. Moreover, even 
where information is available, courts are not well suited to 
conducting social science research. For instance, the informa-
tion they receive is filtered by the litigants, and the rules of dis-
covery and evidence (including the burdens of proof that each 
party carries) may not be appropriate to the conduct of valid so-
cial scientific inquiry. 
Finally, the advance of scientific and social scientific 
knowledge virtually always involves the correction of initial 
hypotheses, and there are problematic institutional costs to 
correcting social scientific errors in Supreme Court opinions. 
The Court’s determinations have precedential value and are 
protected by the principle of stare decisis. Legislative determi-
nations (and, all the more so, administrative guidelines) enjoy 
no such institutional conservatism. Accordingly, they may be 
easier to undo if contrary information later emerges throwing 
into question the facts on which a legislative determination was 
premised. 
2. Democratic Legitimacy 
A second advantage of multilateral participation in consti-
tutional decision making some commentators identify is that it 
can enhance democratic legitimacy.40 To be sure, the relation-
ship between constitutionalism and democratic legitimacy de-
rives from one’s conception of constitutional law and for that 
reason is hotly contested. Those who conceptualize the Consti-
tution as a historical record of the commitments our political 
community has made and who understand constitutional inter-
pretation as the elaboration of those historical commitments41 
may not view multilateral participation as enhancing constitu-
tional legitimacy. Rather, fidelity to past commitments may be 
 
 39. See Devins, supra note 37, at 1978–79. 
 40. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 34; Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, 
Legislative Constitutionalism and Section 5 Power: Policentric Interpretation 
of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1945 (2003); Robert 
C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricen-
tric Restrictions on Section 5 Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1, 19–20 (2003). 
 41. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: 
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 89–117 (2004). 
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both necessary and sufficient to secure democratic legitimacy 
for those of this view. 
For theorists who understand constitutional law in more 
evolutionary terms, however, multilateral participation can 
play a crucial role vis-à-vis democratic legitimacy. If constitu-
tional law is the domain where society’s most fundamental 
commitments are progressively elaborated, then it is not clear 
why courts should be the only participants in this process.42 
The Court’s practice of engaging in proactive constitutional 
hermeneutics reflecting values removed from the contemporary 
societal consensus and not readily located in constitutional text 
or in history threatens democratic legitimacy. Moreover, when 
the Court seeks to situate itself at the vanguard of cultural 
change, it can interrupt the process by which society arrives at 
a consensus on its own: ordinary democratic politics and the 
cultural redefinition that invariably occurs over time. Constitu-
tionalizing a matter, and thereby removing it from democratic 
politics, also can serve to radicalize opponents. 
Drawing on these considerations, several noted scholars 
have questioned the extent to which Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,43 long conceptualized as the paragon of appropriate judi-
cial proactiveness, is properly credited with advancing the 
cause of racial desegregation.44 All support the cause of deseg-
regation and racial equality, but these scholars’ works cast 
doubt on the propriety and efficacy of the Supreme Court’s as-
sumption of a position at the vanguard of cultural change as 
they highlight the important roles that other societal institu-
tions play in refiguring constitutional culture.  
This sort of conceptual schema relating to democratic le-
gitimacy led Professor Post to explain Lawrence’s aforemen- 
 
 
 42. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at xiv (promoting the position that 
broad-based deliberation about constitutional ideals is among “a democratic 
nation’s highest aspirations”). 
 43. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 44. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 290–442 
(2004); CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON 
THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION passim (2004); 
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SO-
CIAL CHANGE? 39–169 (1991). For an excellent review of these and other recent 
works that critically analyze the legacy of Brown, see Cass R. Sunstein, Did 
Brown Matter?, NEW YORKER, May 3, 2004, at 102. For a sharp critique of Pro-
fessor Klarman’s book, see Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: 
In Defense of Brown, 118 HARV. L. REV. 973 (2005) (book review). 
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tioned open-endedness, ambiguities, and internal contradic-
tions as making the opinion “an opening bid in a conversation 
between the Court and the American public”45 on the constitu-
tional status of the incidents of gay life. As a matter of positive 
law, I agree with Post’s observation,46 with the caveat that 
Lawrence is not the opening bid—other societal actors, such as 
Congress in DOMA, already had registered their views on this 
question. The recognition that Lawrence has not decided all is-
sues on gay rights allows other societal actors to add their 
voices in the ongoing process of elaborating our constitutional 
culture. 
The analysis up to this point has been positive rather than 
normative. Before closing, a few words should be said about the 
normative question of whether it is good that the Court has left 
undecided many constitutional questions relating to gay life; 
after all, the mere fact that multilateral participation can be 
beneficial does not mean that the Court should never take a 
lead role in seeking to resolve a controversial issue.47 Unfortu-
nately, there is no widely agreed upon, adequately theorized 
account as to when the Court appropriately takes up the van-
guard or the rear guard on issues of cultural change. Although 
I do not purport to develop a fully elaborated framework here, 
relevant considerations likely include the following: (1) whether 
the constitutional judgment rests on empirical facts about 
which there does not exist sufficient consensus among experts, 
(2) the extent to which the issue is hotly contested in general 
culture, (3) the risks the Court’s imposing a single constitu-
 
 45. Post, supra note 7, at 11. 
 46. Professors Lund and McGinnis argue that “[t]his conversation is a fic-
tion” because the people of the states cannot communicate disagreement with 
the Court by “reenacting their statutes.” Because “[t]his is a ‘conversation’ in 
which the Court issues commands, and those who disagree must obey, . . . the 
dialogue between the Court and the public [is] a pretty one sided conversa-
tion.” Lund & McGinnis, supra note 18, at 1587–88. Lund and McGinnis’s 
point is well taken with regard to statutes criminalizing sodomy (at least un-
der conventional theories of judicial review), but Post makes the different 
point that the potential of meaningful exchange between nonjudicial society 
members and the Supreme Court still exists vis-à-vis the entire spectrum of 
issues concerning gays (such as gay marriage) that have not been decided by 
the opinion. Moreover, the possibility of meaningful conversation remains 
even with respect to issues (such as statutes that criminalize sodomy) that 
have been decided by the Court insofar as the Court from time to time over-
turns earlier decided cases. 
 47. For an insightful elaboration of this point, see Devins, supra note 37, 
at 1973. 
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tional rule pose to societal stability,48 and (4) the risks vis-à-vis 
our constitutional culture of the Court’s not intervening. 
Taking account of these considerations, there may be good 
reasons to applaud Lawrence’s explicit decision to leave many 
things undecided. To begin, the first three factors enumerated 
above suggest that the Court should not take the lead on gay 
rights more than it already has. The fourth factor is less clear. 
Does the Court’s willingness to tolerate a constitutional culture 
in which heterosexuals are permitted to marry but gays may 
not mean accepting a circumstance so at odds with constitu-
tional principles that it risks undermining the legitimacy of the 
Constitution itself in the eyes of its citizenry? The fact that 
American constitutional culture for so long has tolerated far 
worse (the criminalizing of homosexual sex, for example) sug-
gests not. Conversely, judicial activism with regard to hotly 
contested social issues risks undermining judicial authority 
and constitutional culture.49 
Another relevant consideration is whether the Court’s in-
action is likely to stymie the process of cultural change. Where 
majorities have a stranglehold on the airways of cultural and 
political change, there would appear to be a particularly strong 
reason for a nonmajoritarian institution like the Court to play 
an active role.50 Even without court intervention, however, 
there have been significant changes in societal attitudes to-
wards gays over the last decade. In an environment of (rela-
tively) rapidly changing social norms, there may be less need 
for the Court to intervene definitively at an early time and take 
a constitutional position on matters still deeply controversial. 
Judicial imposition of gay marriage on an unwilling citi-
zenry (polls show that strong majorities of Americans today op-
pose gay marriage51) perhaps would hinder the softening of 
American culture’s opposition to gay marriage. The high court 
of Massachusetts’s decision that its state constitution required 
gay marriage appears to have been the impetus behind the 
 
 48. This includes such considerations as the “risks of elected government 
reprisals to unpopular decisionmaking.” Id. at 1979. 
 49. Though judicial authority and constitutional culture are analytically 
distinct concepts, the two tend to be melded together in our world of judicial 
supremacy in which the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution 
typically is thought to constitute the authoritative exposition of what the Con-
stitution requires. See Devins & Fisher, supra note 34, at 83–84. 
 50. See Devins, supra note 37, at 1991. 
 51. See Opposition to Gay Marriage Grows, CBS NEWS, Dec. 21, 2003, 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/19/opinion/polls/main589551.shtml. 
ROSEN_3FMT 04/18/2006 03:28:45 PM 
2006] DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT 931 
 
Marriage Protection Amendment, later defeated in the Sen-
ate.52 A CBS News/New York Times poll found that opposition 
to gay marriage increased following the Massachusetts deci-
sion.53 Would the result in the Senate have been different had 
the Supreme Court announced a federal constitutional right to 
gay marriage in Lawrence? 
D. CONCLUSIONS AS TO WHAT LAWRENCE DID AND DID NOT DO 
What I have argued up to this point does not mean that the 
Supreme Court appropriately assumes a position of “absolute” 
neutrality54 on gay marriage at a time like this. There are per-
spectives particular to the Court’s institutional strengths that 
ought to be put into the mix of viewpoints that help to shape 
the cultural perspectives that ultimately will inform the hard 
doctrine. The Court’s strengths include identifying the over-
arching principles that help constitute our political culture.55 
Fairly read, the Lawrence Court did not remain absolutely neu-
tral, for the Court identified a set of constitutional principles 
that provide significant traction for gay rights advocates.56 But 
nonneutrality is not the same thing as finally deciding a ques-
tion. For the reasons discussed above, the ambiguities, inter-
nally contradictory principles, and novel principles in Lawrence 
mean we should take seriously its express statements that it 
did not resolve other gay rights issues, including gay marriage. 
The Court weighed in on these issues, but it did not decide 
them. 
 
 52. See Helen Dewar & Alan Cooperman, Senate Scuttles Amendment 
Banning Same-Sex Marriage, WASH. POST, July 14, 2004, http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49537-2004Jul14.html. 
 53. See Opposition to Gay Marriage Grows, supra note 51 (reporting that 
opposition to gay marriage increased nationally from fifty-five percent to sixty-
one percent in the month following the Massachusetts decision). 
 54. Even assuming there is such a thing, that is. 
 55. These principles typically do not, on their own, as a matter of “princi-
ple and logic,” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing), dictate outcomes in particular cases because cases typically are junctions 
where multiple principles collide, each principle pointing in a different direc-
tion as to how the matter ought to be resolved. The harmonization of inc-
ommensurable principles is not the result of pure logic but instead is a subjec-
tive process in which societal actors apart from the Supreme Court have 
crucial roles to play. See infra notes 195–98 and accompanying text (discussing 
incommensurability). A work-in-progress more fully explores incommensura-
bility in the context of constitutional doctrine. See Mark D. Rosen, A Cultural 
Approach to Constitutional Law (unpublished manuscript, on file with au-
thor). 
 56. See Post, supra note 7, at 97–101. 
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As a consequence, I conclude that Lawrence did not render 
the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional. The opinion 
arms DOMA’s opponents with an assortment of new weapons. 
Those who deploy them undoubtedly will use the usual advo-
cate’s rhetoric of speaking as if what (in their minds) should be 
already is. But the various societal actors should not be fooled 
by this into thinking that the constitutionality of the various 
incidents of gay life has been decided. It has not. Nonjudicial 
actors in society remain free to call on the principles floated by 
the Lawrence Court, as well as other resources,57 to press their 
views as to what the Constitution does and does not require. 
This critical job is a task that I do not intend to pursue here in 
this Article. Rather than argue what should be, this Article 
only seeks to identify what is: the constitutionality of same-sex 
marriage has not yet been decided, and DOMA has not been 
rendered a nullity by the Lawrence decision. At least not yet. 
II.  RECURRING PRE-LAWRENCE CRITIQUES OF  
DOMA’S CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Even before Lawrence, many of the country’s leading public 
law scholars argued that DOMA was unconstitutional. The Ar-
ticle’s next three Parts seek to answer these scholars’ critiques. 
In so doing, the Article identifies the constitutional bases for 
congressional power to enact DOMA (primarily the Effects 
Clause of Article IV, Section 1) and explains why DOMA does 
not violate any constitutional side-constraints. 
More specifically, Part II dissects four claims regarding 
DOMA’s unconstitutionality, each of which has been advanced 
by multiple scholars. Two of the arguments rest on demonstra-
bly incorrect assumptions. The other two arguments tacitly as-
sume that the Supreme Court has the final say in determining 
what the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires. Part III forth-
rightly analyzes this crucial question concerning Congress’s 
and the President’s powers under the Effects Clause. The crit-
ics’ second set of constitutional challenges dissolves under the 
interpretation of the Effects Clause proffered in Part III. Part 
IV defends DOMA against an additional Full Faith and Credit 
 
 57. See supra note 34. What other resources and methodologies (apart 
from precedent) are appropriately utilized by societal actors apart from the 
Supreme Court when they work out constitutional meaning? This is a very 
important, undertheorized question. For an excellent start at answering this, 
see Neal Kumar Katyal, Legislative Constitutional Interpretation, 50 DUKE 
L.J. 1335 (2001). 
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Clause-based challenge that a highly regarded scholar has ad-
vanced. 
Before proceeding, it is useful to briefly situate DOMA in 
the context of full faith and credit jurisprudence. The Constitu-
tion states that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each 
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of 
every other State”58 without differentiating among acts, re-
cords, and judicial proceedings. The Court’s jurisprudence, 
however, has long treated each of these categories differently. 
Under today’s case law, states have a virtually ironclad obliga-
tion to give effect to judgments from sister states59 but are vir-
tually never required to apply another state’s acts or records.60 
Marriage is not a judgment but instead is either a “public act” 
or “record.”61 For this reason, although states typically give ef-
fect to marriages that were valid where the marriage occurred, 
nearly everyone agrees that this so-called “place of celebration 
rule” is a state common-law rule rather than a constitutional 
mandate.62 Unlike a constitutional mandate, state law can 
override a common-law rule—for example, under a public-
policy exception, a sister state’s law need not be applied if doing 
so would violate a strong public policy of the forum. 
Thus, even without DOMA, there is strong authority for 
concluding that states would not be subject to a constitutional 
obligation to give effect to a same-sex marriage performed in 
another state. By contrast, most commentators believe that a 
forum state would be required under full faith and credit 
precedent to recognize and enforce a sister-state judgment 
based on a law that recognized same-sex marriages.63 The gen-
 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 59. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 231–36 (1998). 
 60. If application of the forum’s substantive law is consistent with due 
process, then application of its law also will not be deemed to violate the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307–08 
(1980); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 824 (1985) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that contemporary 
doctrine “treats the two relevant constitutional provisions [the Full Faith and 
Credit and Due Process Clauses] as though they imposed the same constraints 
on the forum court”). 
 61. David P. Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Marriages, 1 GREEN BAG 2D 
7, 10–11 (1997). 
 62. See Koppelman, supra note 4, at 10. For my critical analysis of a 
prominent scholar’s recent argument that full faith and credit makes the place 
of celebration rule a constitutional requirement, see infra Part IV. 
 63. See Letter from Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard Law School, to 
Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (May 24, 1996), in 142 CONG. REC. S5931, S5932–33 
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eral view is that DOMA purports to authorize states to deviate 
from the ordinary requirements of full faith and credit doctrine 
regarding foreign judgments.64 In the view of most scholars 
who believe DOMA to be constitutional, Congress had the 
power to authorize such deviations on the basis of its powers 
under the so-called “Effects Clause”—which provides that “the 
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which 
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Ef-
fect thereof”65—when it enacted DOMA.66 I take a different 
view: although I agree that Congress has the power to provide 
different rules than those laid down by the Court, I argue that 
DOMA properly understood is not inconsistent with the Court’s 
precedents. 
A. FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 
An oft-repeated critique is that DOMA is unconstitutional 
because it flatly subverts the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s 
foundational principle. According to Dean Larry Kramer, the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause “represents the very idea of what 
it means to be in a Union. States are required to recognize and 
respect each other’s laws because that is what members of a 
federation do.”67 Professor Andrew Koppelman similarly argues 
that “[t]he preeminent purpose of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause is to promote uniformity of result across the nation.”68 
Professor Laurence Tribe likewise has spoken of the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause’s “nationally unifying shield”69 and quoted 
language from the hoary case of Hughes v. Fetter70 that spoke of 
“the strong unifying principle embodied in the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause looking toward maximum enforcement in each 
state of the obligations or rights created or recognized 
by . . . sister states.”71 All of these scholars have argued that 
 
(daily ed. June 6, 1996) [hereinafter Tribe Letter]; Koppelman, supra note 4, 
at 22; Kramer, supra note 4, at 2006. 
 64. See Tribe Letter, supra note 63; Koppelman, supra note 4, at 22; 
Kramer, supra note 4, at 2006.  
 65. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 66. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 26 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2930. 
 67. Kramer, supra note 4, at 2006. 
 68. Koppelman, supra note 4, at 22. 
 69. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5932. 
 70. 341 U.S. 609 (1951). 
 71. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5933 (omission in original) (quoting 
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951)). 
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DOMA is unconstitutional because it runs counter to this foun-
dational principle of unification insofar as it provides that 
states need not give effect to other states’ acts or judgments 
“respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that 
is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State.”72 
These arguments rest on an incomplete conception of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause’s purposes. It is true that the 
Court’s rhetoric sometimes suggests that unification is all that 
full faith and credit is about.73 Case law makes clear, however, 
that the Clause aims not only at unifying the states, but also at 
ensuring that the states remain meaningfully empowered, dis-
tinct polities.74 In Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial 
Accident Commission, for example, the Court permitted Cali-
fornia to apply its own workmen’s compensation statute to a 
Massachusetts employee of a Massachusetts employer who had 
been injured while in California in the course of his employ-
ment.75 The Supreme Court held that “[t]he full faith and credit 
clause does not require one state to substitute for its own stat-
ute, applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting 
statute of another state, even though that statute is of control-
ling force in the courts of the state of its enactment with respect 
to the same persons and events.”76 As the italicized language in-
dicates, the Court understood that the full faith and credit doc-
 
 72. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). 
 73. See, e.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (“The 
animating purpose of the full faith and credit command, as this Court ex-
plained in Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935), ‘was to 
alter the status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, 
each free to ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial pro-
ceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation 
throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of 
right, irrespective of the state of its origin.’ Id., at 277.”). 
 74. Stated differently, the principle of unification is not unalloyed, but is 
tempered by a concern for preserving state autonomy, as will be discussed 
above in text. To be sure, this second aspect of full faith and credit received far 
less attention by the Founders than the goal of unification. See generally 
Ralph U. Whitten, The Original Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 255 (1998) 
(setting forth the historical groundwork for the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
and discussing its varied historic and contemporary interpretations). This is 
not surprising, for the pressing problem at that time was unifying states that, 
if anything, were too sovereign. As the Union became stable, the second com-
ponent of full faith and credit—guarding state sovereignty—emerged in the 
case law, as will be discussed in text. 
 75. 306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939). 
 76. Id. (emphasis added). 
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trine it was fashioning would have allowed a Massachusetts 
court to apply Massachusetts law on the identical facts had the 
lawsuit been filed in Massachusetts instead of California. This 
is still the state of the law.77 
The outcome in Pacific Employers is inexplicable if the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause is conceptualized in the manner pro-
pounded by Dean Kramer and Professors Koppelman and 
Tribe. Notwithstanding Koppelman’s description of full faith 
and credit, Pacific Employers does not “promote uniformity of 
result across the nation.”78 Just the opposite is true: the Court 
itself recognized that the law applied would turn entirely on 
whether the lawsuit was filed in California or Massachusetts. 
Contrary to Tribe’s view, the case is not readily characterized 
as reflecting the principle of “maximum enforcement in each 
state of the obligations or rights created or recognized 
by . . . sister states.”79 Similarly, it cannot be said that the case 
required that California “recognize and respect [Massachu-
setts’s] laws because that is what members of a federation 
do,”80 pace the understanding of full faith and credit proffered 
by Dean Kramer. 
By contrast, Pacific Employers is readily understandable 
on recognizing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause aims not 
just at unification but also at protecting each state’s sover-
eignty. The Court stated explicitly: 
  To the extent that California is required to give full faith and 
credit to the conflicting Massachusetts statute it must be denied the 
right to apply in its own courts its own statute, constitutionally en-
acted in pursuance of its [own] policy . . . . 
  . . . While the purpose of [the Full Faith and Credit Clause] was to 
preserve rights acquired or confirmed under the public acts and judi-
cial proceedings of one state by requiring recognition of their validity 
in other states, the very nature of the federal union of states, to which 
are reserved some of the attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to 
the full faith and credit clause as the means for compelling a state to 
substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing 
with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.81 
 
 77. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727 (1988) (“[S]ince the leg-
islative jurisdictions of the States overlap, it is frequently the case under the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause that a court can lawfully apply either the law of 
one State or the contrary law of another.”). 
 78. Koppelman, supra note 4, at 22. 
 79. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5933 (omission in original) (quoting 
Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951)). 
 80. Kramer, supra note 4, at 2006. 
 81. Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 
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The Full Faith and Credit Clause’s coordinate concerns for 
both unification and meaningful state autonomy could not have 
been stated more clearly. 
In short, the scholars discussed above oversimplify full 
faith and credit. It is not solely concerned with union, but with 
union of a certain kind: a union of meaningfully empowered 
subfederal polities.82 Analysis considering only one pole in a 
dialectic is methodologically suspect. Unfortunately, myopic ob-
session with only one of the Clause’s dual principles infects the 
arguments of the scholars discussed above.83 
One may object that the notion that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause incorporates twin goals in tension with one an-
other applies to public acts but not to judgments. Such an ob-
jection is unavailing for three reasons. First, any such distinc-
tion is not analytically sensible because the tension between 
unification and maintaining meaningful state autonomy is pre-
sent not only when a state is asked to apply a sister state’s law 
but also when it is asked to apply a sister state’s judgment.84 
Second, the text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause suggests 
that acts and judgments implicate similar issues, for the 
Clause addresses both acts and judgments in a single sentence 
and by its terms applies the same rule to each. Finally, as a 
purely descriptive matter, it cannot be said that the full faith 
and credit doctrine resolves the tension by permitting the prin-
 
(1939). This is not to say that I agree with the case’s ultimate holding. My dis-
agreement stems not from a view that the Clause advances only one purpose, 
but because I think the Court gave inadequate weight to Massachusetts’s in-
terest. I hope to pursue this line of inquiry in a future work. 
 82. Cf. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 323 (1981) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause protects the “fed-
eral interest in national unity” by ensuring that states do not “unjustifiably 
infring[e] upon the legitimate interests of another State”). 
 83. There are two ways that this point may be conceptualized: first, that 
there are two competing principles, unification and state autonomy; or second, 
that there is a single principle of unifying states that retain certain autonomy. 
I do not perceive any meaningful difference between the two formulations for 
present purposes, and hereinafter my analysis utilizes only the former “dual 
principle” approach. 
 84.  See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 236–38 (1908). Requiring 
state A to enforce a judgment from state B that is based on state B ’s misappli-
cation of state A’s law facilitates unification (insofar as a judgment from the 
court of one state can be enforced everywhere else), but does so at the expense 
of state A’s sovereign interests. Recognizing these tensions has important im-
plications for the appropriate roles that societal institutions apart from the 
Supreme Court play in elaborating what the Full Faith and Credit Clause re-
quires. See infra Part III.C.3. 
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ciple of unification to prevail in one context (judgments) and 
state autonomy to prevail in the other (acts). Although it is true 
that full faith and credit doctrine with regard to judgments 
typically favors unification insofar as the judgments of sister 
states almost always must be recognized, there are several 
types of judgments that sister states need not recognize.85 
These exceptions have been justified on the ground that requir-
ing recognition would unduly interfere with the forum state’s 
autonomy.86 Conversely, full faith and credit sometimes re-
quires state courts to apply another state’s law notwithstand-
ing a forum policy to do otherwise.87 
What does all this mean for DOMA? Whereas DOMA is in-
compatible on its face with the oversimplified conception of full 
faith and credit articulated by the scholars discussed above, it 
is consistent with the enriched conception of full faith and 
credit. This is so because DOMA is a statute that resolves the 
tension between unification and state autonomy in favor of the 
latter. Because the Full Faith and Credit Clause seeks to ad-
vance principles that are in tension with one another, and be-
cause DOMA is compatible with one of these principles, it can-
not be said that DOMA is flatly incompatible with the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause on the basis of first principles. 
B. TENTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS 
1. Interference with State Prerogatives 
Professors Laurence Tribe and Stanley Cox both argue that 
DOMA violates the Tenth Amendment. Tribe suggests that 
 
 85. For example, a forum state need not recognize a sister state’s decree 
concerning land ownership that seeks to transfer title in the forum state, see 
Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 13 (1909), nor give effect to an antisuit injunction 
issued by a sister state, see Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 236 
(1998). For further discussion of these exceptions, see infra Part II.C. 
 86. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 238 (holding that a Michigan judgment pre-
cluding a party from testifying cannot “control courts elsewhere by precluding 
them, in actions brought by strangers to the [issuing state’s] litigation, from 
determining for themselves what witnesses are competent to testify and what 
evidence is relevant and admissible in their search for the truth”); id. at 240 
(declaring that the issuing state’s “power does not reach into a Missouri court-
room to displace the forum’s own determination whether to admit or exclude 
evidence”); Fall, 215 U.S. at 10, 12 (arguing that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause “does not extend the jurisdiction of the courts of one state to property 
situated in another” and that holding otherwise would violate the policy of the 
forum state). 
 87. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951). 
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Congress does not have the power to “exempt” a narrow “cate-
gory of judgments” from the requirements of full faith and 
credit.88 He says that DOMA “create[s] a precedent dangerous 
to the very idea of a United States of America.”89 If DOMA is 
permissible, then Congress can pick and choose any substan-
tive field governed by state law—let’s say commercial judg-
ments—and render “any State’s official acts, on any subject, to 
second-class status” that need not receive full faith and credit, 
undermining the “Tenth Amendment’s unambiguous language, 
that ours is a National Government whose powers are limited 
to those enumerated in the Constitution itself.”90 Cox similarly 
argues that DOMA is unconstitutional because it is “solely sub-
stantive rather than jurisdictionally based” and hence is not 
“content neutral.”91 “[B]ecause it invalidates state judgments 
based on their content alone,” says Cox, “DOMA thereby viti-
ates state sovereignty.”92 
Under contemporary Tenth Amendment doctrines, these 
arguments are parasitic on the conclusion that the Effects 
Clause does not authorize Congress to enact DOMA. The Court 
has held that “whether an Act of Congress invades the province 
of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment” is a 
“mirror image[]” of the question of “whether an act of Congress 
is authorized by one of the powers delegated to Con-
gress . . . in . . . the Constitution.”93 DOMA accordingly invades 
the province of sovereignty only if it is not authorized under the 
Effects Clause. The question at hand is whether DOMA falls 
within Congress’s Effects Clause powers. The arguments ad-
vanced by Tribe and Cox do not answer this question but in-
stead assume the conclusion that subject-matter-specific legis-
lation is not authorized by the scope of the Effects Clause. 
Perhaps Tribe’s and Cox’s Tenth Amendment claims can be 
construed as policy arguments for not interpreting the Effects 
Clause in a manner that would subvert state sovereignty. If so, 
their arguments are premised on a distorted understanding of 
what DOMA does. Tribe’s and Cox’s stated beliefs that Con-
 
 88. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5932. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Stanley E. Cox, DOMA and Conflicts Law: Congressional Rules and 
Domestic Relations Conflicts Law, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1063, 1081–82 
(1999). 
 92. Id. at 1064. 
 93. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155–56 (1992). 
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gress should not be able to use the Effects Clause to “modify or 
displace substantive state policy” with regard to subject mat-
ters that fall outside of Congress’s appropriate regulatory pow-
ers drive their arguments.94 Such assertions fail because 
DOMA does not “modify or displace substantive state policy” or 
“replace state substantive policy with Congressional value 
preferences.”95 For example, Massachusetts’s decision to permit 
same-sex marriages is neither modified nor displaced. 
What DOMA does regulate, however, is a quintessentially 
federal function, and for that reason the statute does not impli-
cate Tenth Amendment considerations. DOMA regulates the 
extraterritorial effects of the Massachusetts law and of Massa-
chusetts records and judgments that are based on that law. 
Setting the scope of subfederal polities’ extraterritorial powers 
naturally falls within the federal government’s purview be-
cause subfederal polities are apt to pursue only their state in-
terests and systematically discount the externalities they im-
pose on other subfederal polities. The federal polity is more 
likely to take account of the interests of all subfederal polities 
because Congress contains representatives from all the subfed-
eral polities, whereas state governments obviously do not. Fur-
thermore, the federal polity is institutionally charged with the 
responsibility of looking out for the interests of the Union. 
These considerations have led many commentators to argue 
that Congress should create a federal choice-of-law statute.96 
These considerations also have been invoked to explain why 
Congress can displace dormant Commerce Clause limitations 
on state protectionist legislation.97 
In short, DOMA does not regulate substantive state poli-
cies that properly fall to the states. Rather, DOMA regulates 
the extraterritorial effects of state policies—an eminently fed-
eral function that accordingly does not improperly trench on 
state sovereignty. 
 
 94. Cox, supra note 91, at 1075. 
 95. Id.  
 96. See Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: 
The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 301 
(1992) (arguing that Congress’s Effects Clause powers are considerable and 
citing several scholars who “agree[ ] that [this] includes power to specify 
choice-of-law rules”). 
 97. See Mark D. Rosen, A Surprisingly Strong Case for Tailoring Consti-
tutional Principles, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1571–75 (2005). 
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2. Subject-Matter-Specific Congressional Enactments 
Tribe’s and Cox’s Tenth Amendment arguments impliedly 
raise the question of whether Congress can appropriately de-
termine the extraterritorial effects of one state’s acts on a sub-
ject-matter basis.98 There is a plausible textual basis to con-
clude not: the Effects Clause, after all, states that Congress 
“may by general laws” prescribe the effect of acts, records, and 
proceedings,99 and one might argue that subject-matter-specific 
legislation is not a “general” law.100 There is an alternative 
plausible interpretation of the language of “general laws,”101 
however, and there are strong reasons to reject a construction 
of the Effects Clause that would prevent Congress from enact-
ing subject-matter-specific legislation. 
First, to the extent that patterns of congressional behavior 
are instructive in interpreting constitutional provisions,102 it is 
 
 98. See Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5932 (arguing that Congress does 
not have the power to “exempt” a narrow “category of judgments” from the re-
quirements of full faith and credit); Cox, supra note 91, at 1082 (arguing that 
DOMA is unconstitutional because its rules are “substantive rather than 
jurisdictionally based”). 
 99. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 100. A student comment makes this textual argument. See Julie L.B. John-
son, Comment, The Meaning of “General Laws”: The Extent of Congress’s 
Power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Constitutionality of the 
Defense of Marriage Act, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1611, 1639–40, 1643 (1997). The 
comment argues that “Congress’s power under the Clause [is] to be exercised 
only in broad strokes, and not narrowly to determine the effect of particular 
acts, records, and proceedings,” and that DOMA accordingly is constitutionally 
suspect because it deals with only a “narrow group” of “proceedings within 
th[e] class” of marriages. Id. The author has provided neither legislative his-
tory nor case law to support it. In text, I provide precedent- and policy-based 
reasons for rejecting such an interpretation. 
 101. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Effects Clause’s reference to “general 
laws” might mean that Congress does not have the power to enact legislation 
that addresses only individual cases. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. RO-
TUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 967 (7th ed. 2004). Such a limitation would 
parallel the Constitution’s ban on bills of attainder, which prevents states 
from enacting legislation that imposes punishments on specified individuals. 
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
 102. Several constitutional doctrines treat the longstanding practices of the 
coordinate branches of government as evidence of constitutionality. See, e.g., 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring) (indicating that Congress’s acquiescence to or authoriza-
tion of the President’s seizure of private property during national emergencies 
supports the constitutionality of such acts); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 683 
(1892) (noting that the longstanding practice of Congress delegating authority 
to the President under the Taxing Clause “is entitled to great weight”); see 
also David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 
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notable that Congress has enacted legislation addressing the 
effects of laws and judgments limited to discrete subject mat-
ters: there are separate federal statutes on child custody or-
ders, child support orders, and protective orders in relation to 
domestic violence.103 Moreover, as Professor Emily Sack has 
shown, “Congress has in fact been selective in determining 
which judgments will be entitled to full faith and credit, based 
on policy choices” in the Parental Kidnapping Protection Act 
(PKPA).104 For example, although the PKPA generally grants 
full faith and credit status only to custody judgments rendered 
in the state in which a child currently lives, it permits a nonab-
ducting parent to bring custody proceedings in his or her own 
state.105 Despite the fact that the child’s new state of residence 
might “have a connection that is equal, and arguably, more sig-
nificant than the state permitted to have jurisdiction,” Con-
gress likely “did not want to penalize a parent who remained in 
a state after the other parent had abducted the child to another 
state.”106 By effectively discriminating against state laws based 
on policy choices, Congress has legislated in a manner inconsis-
tent with Tribe’s and Cox’s theories. While the two professors 
are free to conclude that the PKPA and these other statutes are 
unconstitutional insofar as the statutes deviate from their 
theories, the above-noted pattern of congressional practice cou-
pled with the absence of constitutional challenges suggest that 
it is the scholarly theories, rather than the several statutes, 
that require reworking. 
Second, it is desirable for Congress to have the power to 
enact laws that are subject-matter sensitive. There are strong 
reasons to believe that an intelligent full faith and credit doc-
trine is not amenable to broad, transsubstantive rules but in-
variably will be highly context sensitive. This is due to the two 
 
190, 201 (1988) (explaining that “it is a commonplace that a legislative judg-
ment that a statute is constitutional is generally entitled to some deference 
from a court, especially when that judgment is made after detailed considera-
tion of the constitutional question”); Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Con-
stitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters, 106 YALE L.J. 845, 
872–76 (1996) (book review) (discussing some scholars’ view that congressional 
practice is relevant to ascertaining the Constitution’s allocation powers with 
regard to declaring war). 
 103. See infra note 187 (enumerating these statutes). 
 104. See Emily J. Sack, Domestic Violence Across State Lines: The Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, Congressional Power, and Interstate Enforcement of 
Protection Orders, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 827, 895 (2004).  
 105. Id. at 894. 
 106. Id. at 894–95. 
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oft-conflicting principles that animate full faith and credit: cre-
ating (1) a national union of (2) meaningfully empowered sub-
federal polities. Full faith and credit doctrine must be context 
sensitive because, although enforcing another state’s laws or 
judgments always advances the cause of national unity, the 
burden imposed on the forum state will be a function of the 
substance of the law or judgment itself. 
Experience and theory confirm the inadequacy of abstract, 
transsubstantive rules for purposes of full faith and credit doc-
trine. Consider first the Supreme Court’s full faith and credit 
jurisprudence itself. Notwithstanding broad pronouncements 
that judgments from sister states must be enforced,107 the 
Court has recognized several exceptions.108 Additional evidence 
of the inadequacy of transsubstantive laws in the full faith and 
credit context can be found in the related field of choice of law. 
Virtually everyone agrees that the Effects Clause “includes 
power to specify choice-of-law rules.”109 In this regard, it is em-
pirically instructive that efforts to create transsubstantive so-
lutions to conflicts-of-law quandaries have proven inade-
quate.110 There are strong theoretical reasons to think that 
 
 107. See, e.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (“Re-
garding judgments . . . the full faith and credit obligation is exacting.”). 
 108. See, e.g., id. at 236 (determining that a forum state need not give ef-
fect to an antisuit injunction issued by a sister state); Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 
1, 10–12 (1909) (determining that a forum state need not recognize a sister 
state’s decree concerning land ownership that seeks to transfer title in the fo-
rum state). 
 109. See Laycock, supra note 96, at 301. 
 110. Though the Second Restatement of Conflicts may not receive appropri-
ate criticism for its transsubstantive character insofar as it does distinguish 
between contracts, property, and torts, the Restatement’s core legal test—
Section 6’s “most significant relationship” test and its accompanying list of 
considerations—provides the applicable legal rules for all these areas. See 
EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 60–63 (4th ed. 2004). 
In the context of this Article, it is impossible to fully demonstrate that the 
inadequacy of the Second Restatement of Conflicts is attributable in no small 
part to its transsubstantive character. Although most scholars agree that the 
Second Restatement of Conflicts has not been a success, see generally Friedrich 
K. Juenger, A Third Conflicts Restatement?, 75 IND. L.J. 403 (2000) (present-
ing a symposium on whether the Second Restatement should be discarded and 
replaced by a new Restatement), there are many possible explanations for the 
Restatement’s failures. The answer, in my view, is that three factors have con-
tributed to the Restatement’s deficiencies: (1) the Restatement’s authors did not 
make decisions among the various approaches to choice of law but instead 
adopted virtually all of them, thereby creating an unprincipled grab bag; (2) 
the Restatement adopted the wrong choice-of-law rules; and (3) the effort to 
create transsubstantive conflicts rules is misbegotten. 
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transsubstantive choice-of-law rules are doomed to be inade-
quate, if not wholesale failures. Nearly all contemporary ap-
proaches to choice of law understand it not as a distinct body of 
“procedural” law but instead as an aspect of the substantive 
law. A bit of background is necessary to make this clear. Choice 
of law determines which polity’s law governs a transaction or 
occurrence that cuts across more than a single polity. Perhaps 
the most important insight of interest analysis, an insight that 
virtually all contemporary approaches to choice of law have 
adopted, is that many apparent conflicts, upon careful exami-
nation, really amount to “false conflicts” to which only one law 
sensibly applies.111 Courts determine whether there is a false 
conflict by considering the purpose of each state’s substantive 
law and asking whether the legislature would have wished to 
regulate the party, transaction, or occurrence. The process of 
deciding whether there is a false conflict hence involves ascer-
taining the scope of the substantive law of each potentially in-
terested jurisdiction—a determination that necessarily is sub-
ject sensitive rather than transsubstantive. 
Thus, if the modern conflicts approach of first eliminating 
“false” conflicts is indeed a genuine contribution, it follows that 
efficacious choice-of-law doctrines invariably are an aspect of 
substantive law and that searching for transsubstantive choice-
of-law principles is hopeless. If so, Congress must have the 
power under the Effects Clause to generate subject-matter-
specific choice-of-law rules. Conversely, a limitation of the sort 
put forward by Tribe and Cox, under which Congress cannot 
make subject-matter-sensitive choice-of-law rules, would doom 
to failure any congressional enactments to create sensible 
choice-of-law rules under the Effects Clause. 
 
 
 111. Interest analysis forthrightly inquires as to whether there is a true or 
false conflict: “many courts that claim to follow the Second Restatement’s 
‘most significant relationship’ test . . . apply it in a way that is indistinguish-
able from straightforward interest analysis,” and “other modern approaches 
all build on” interest analysis. DAVID P. CURRIE, HERMAN HILL KAY, & LARRY 
KRAMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 132 (6th ed. 
2001). It is with respect to how “true conflicts” are to be handled that the mod-
ern approaches diverge. See generally id. at 168–98 (discussing “true con-
flicts”). It is only the traditional choice-of-law approach, which a minority of 
scholars and fewer than twenty percent of the states champion, that rejects 
interest analysis’s “false conflicts” approach. See Symeon C. Symeonides, 
Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2003: Seventeenth Annual Survey, 52 
AM. J. COMP. L. 9, 26–27 (2004). 
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C. CLAIMS THAT DOMA IS INCONSISTENT WITH SUPREME 
COURT PRECEDENT 
Virtually all DOMA critics share the assumption that 
DOMA purports to authorize states to give less faith and credit 
to sister-state judgments than Supreme Court precedent re-
quires.112 From this, the argument goes, DOMA is unconstitu-
tional because the Supreme Court has the final say in deter-
mining what the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires.113 Part 
III of the Article takes issue with the view that the Court’s 
views of full faith and credit trump Congress’s. This subsection 
undermines the critics’ assumption that DOMA’s rule is incon-
sistent with Supreme Court precedent. 
It is true that the Supreme Court’s full faith and credit ju-
risprudence almost always requires that states enforce sister-
state judgments. It is also true that the Court recently stated 
that there is “no roving ‘public policy exception’ to the full faith 
and credit due judgments.”114 Against this background, the crit-
ics’ assumption that DOMA is inconsistent with the Court’s 
precedent may seem irrefutable. There are two reasons, how-
ever, to understand DOMA’s rule with regarding judgments as 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent. First, DOMA shares 
important characteristics with the small class of judgments 
that the Supreme Court does not require states to enforce, 
namely, judgments that constitute improper extraterritorial 
regulation by the issuing state. Second, even if DOMA is a pub-
lic policy rule rather than an antiextraterritoriality rule, it cre-
ates a public policy exception that operates differently in cru-
cial ways from those the Court has rejected. The next two 
subsections address each of these reasons seriatim. 
1. An Antiextraterritoriality Rule 
The judgments that DOMA addresses share important 
characteristics with the small class of sister-state judgments 
 
 112. See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 4, at 15–16; see also Kramer, supra 
note 4, at 2000 (“Existing law does not . . . allow one state to refuse recognition 
to the final judgment of another state’s courts.”); Sack, supra note 104, at 888. 
 113. See Sack, supra note 104, at 895–96. 
 114. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998); see also id. at 
234 (“We are ‘aware of [no] considerations of local policy or law which could 
rightly be deemed to impair the force and effect which the full faith and credit 
clause and the Act of Congress require to be given to [a money] judgment out-
side the state of its rendition.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Magnolia Pe-
troleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438 (1943))). 
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the Supreme Court does not require states to enforce. The 
Court repeatedly has held that judgments that constitute im-
proper efforts by the issuing state to regulate extraterritorially 
exceed the issuing state’s regulatory jurisdiction and need not 
be enforced.115 Thus, when the Court held that a Michigan 
judgment preventing a Mr. Elwell from testifying against Gen-
eral Motors did not preclude a Missouri court from allowing Mr. 
Elwell to testify, the Court explained that “Michigan’s power 
does not reach into a Missouri courtroom to displace the fo-
rum’s own determination whether to admit or exclude evi-
dence.”116 When the Supreme Court ruled that a court in one 
state cannot issue a decree that transfers title to property that 
is located in another state, it explained that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause “does not extend the jurisdiction of the courts of 
one State to property situated in another.”117 Judgments based 
 
 115. It is worth noting that extraterritorial regulation by states is not per 
se invalid. See Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Heterogeneity 
in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 919–30 (2002). 
 116. Baker, 522 U.S. at 240; see also id. at 238 (stating that Michigan’s 
judgment cannot “control courts elsewhere by precluding them, in actions 
brought by strangers to the [issuing state’s] litigation, from determining for 
themselves what witnesses are competent to testify and what evidence is rele-
vant and admissible in their search for the truth”). 
 117. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 12 (1909). As my colleague Laura Cooper 
has reminded me, the language in Fall that appears to erect an impermeable 
barrier protecting the property situated in one state from judicial interference 
by other states has been undermined by the Court’s “refus[al] to recognize an 
exception to the rule of jurisdictional finality for cases involving real property 
over which the State claims exclusive jurisdiction.” Underwriters Nat’l Assur-
ance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 455 U.S. 691, 705 
n.11 (1982). By refusing to permit the second court to challenge the first 
court’s jurisdictional determination in such cases, the doctrine permits an out-
come where a court in state B must enforce a judgment from a court in state A 
with respect to property Z, despite the fact that state B claims exclusive juris-
diction over property Z. 
There are two reasons why Underwriters nonetheless does not undermine 
the proposition that the Court has conceptualized as an antiextraterritorial 
rule the doctrine that a judgment from state A purporting to transfer title to 
real property in state B need not be enforced by courts in state B. First, even 
after Underwriters, the Supreme Court has continued to explain Fall as an 
antiextraterritoriality decision: in 1998 the Court explained Fall as a decision 
in which an 
[o]rder[ ] commanding action or inaction [was] denied enforcement in 
a sister State when [it] purported to accomplish an official act within 
the exclusive province of that other State or interfered with litigation 
over which the ordering State had no authority. Thus, a sister State’s 
decree concerning land ownership in another State has been held in-
effective to transfer title, see Fall v. Eastin . . . . 
Baker, 522 U.S. at 235 (first emphasis added, second emphasis omitted). 
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on penal or tax laws also do not have to be enforced. The Court 
has characterized such laws as exceptions to its ordinary full 
faith and credit jurisprudence and has explained these excep-
tions in similar antiextraterritorial terms.118 Finally, the Su-
 
Second, Underwriters at most means that the antiextraterritoriality rule 
is not categorical, and the proposition above in text that Fall has been under-
stood as an antiextraterritorial rule does not depend on its being a categorical 
rule. Indeed, the fact that the antiextraterritorial rule is not categorical should 
not be surprising because virtually all constitutional principles are noncate-
gorical; for instance, the fact that Congress is sometimes permitted to regulate 
speech (i.e., when there is a compelling interest and the regulation is narrowly 
tailored) does not mean that there does not exist a constitutional principle of 
free speech. See Mark D. Rosen, Modeling Constitutional Doctrine, 49 ST. 
LOUIS L.J. 691, 706 (2005). Moreover, considerations of finality of the sort 
found in Underwriters have been held to override threshold jurisdictional 
flaws in other contexts. For example, notwithstanding the strong principle 
that a federal court must dismiss an action if it becomes apparent that it lacks 
subject-matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3), the Supreme Court re-
fused to vacate a final judgment where the federal court had mistakenly 
granted a motion to remand (there was an absence of full diversity at the time 
the motion to remand was granted) and where the defendant would have been 
unable to subsequently remove the case on account of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)’s 
one-year rule had the federal court correctly ruled on the initial motion to re-
mand. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 64 (1996). Rather, once the case 
had been tried in federal court, “considerations of finality, efficiency, and econ-
omy bec[a]me overwhelming.” Id. at 75. The Caterpillar decision does not ne-
gate the strong principle that federal courts cannot hear matters over which 
they lack subject-matter jurisdiction, but it shows that considerations of final-
ity sometimes can override very strong jurisdictional principles. 
In short, although the precise limitations on state extraterritorial powers 
are more complex to identify after Underwriters insofar as the extraterritorial 
rule is noncategorical, it remains true that Supreme Court doctrine recognizes 
limits on state courts’ powers in relation to orders that purport to transfer title 
in other states, and that the Court continues to conceptualize these limits as 
an antiextraterritoriality rule. 
It may be the case that Fall is best understood as an application of the 
general rule that enforcement mechanisms do not travel with judgments to 
sister states under the hoary precedent of McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 
38 U.S. 312, 325 (1839). The fact that Fall itself cited to McElmoyle supports 
this approach. See Fall, 215 U.S. at 12. Conceptualizing Fall as an application 
of McElmoyle would not undermine my argument in text, however, for McEl-
moyle understood its holding as an antiextraterritoriality rule. See McElmoyle, 
38 U.S. at 326, 327 (holding that a sister state’s judgment is “put upon the 
footing of a domestic judgment; by which is meant, not having the operation 
and force of a domestic judgment beyond the jurisdiction declaring it to be a 
judgment, but a domestic judgment as to the merits of the claim, or subject-
matter of the suit” and explaining that “the Constitution did not mean to con-
fer a new power of jurisdiction” (emphasis added)). 
 118. See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892) (“Laws have 
no force of themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the State which enacts them, 
and can have extra-territorial effect only by the comity of other States. . . . 
Crimes are in their nature local, and the jurisdiction of crimes is local, . . . and 
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preme Court has approvingly noted that state courts typically 
do not enforce antisuit injunctions from other state courts, for 
“hold[ing] otherwise ‘would mean in effect that the courts of one 
state can control what goes on in the courts of another.’”119 In 
short, the Court has deemed wrongful exterritorial regulation 
the common ground shared by judgments and miscellaneous 
state orders that need not be enforced by a sister state. 
As the House Report on DOMA clarifies, the drafters de-
signed DOMA’s judgments provision to combat the same issue 
of problematic extraterritorial regulation.120 Congress enacted 
DOMA when it appeared that Hawaii was to become the first 
state to marry gay couples.121 Some gay rights advocates ar-
gued that gay couples married in Hawaii should request that a 
Hawaii court authenticate the marriage with a declaratory 
judgment.122 Many believed that the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause would have required other states to respect such de-
claratory judgments.123 The House Committee report on DOMA 
 
the authorities, legislative, executive or judicial, of other States take no action 
with regard to [crimes and offenses]”(internal quotation omitted)) (describing 
the penal law exception); Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881) 
(“No state can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction”) (describ-
ing the tax law exception). For a recent case discussing penal judgments, see 
Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970) (observing that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause “does not require that sister States enforce a foreign penal 
judgment”). 
 119. Baker, 522 U.S. at 236 n.9 (quoting Willis L. Reese, Full Faith and 
Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 IOWA L. REV. 183, 198 (1957)). Though the 
Supreme Court stated that it “has not yet ruled” on the question of whether 
antisuit injunctions must be enforced, it has spoken approvingly of the prac-
tice in dictum. See id. In fact, it is plausible that the Court’s approval of the 
current state courts’ practice, which, “in the main, regard[s] antisuit injunc-
tions as outside the Full Faith and Credit ambit,” was a component of the 
Court’s holding in the Baker case. See id. 
 120. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2–10 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2906–14. 
 121. Id. 
 122. See Koppelman, supra note 4, at 17. 
 123. See sources cited in id. at 17 & n.87. A reader of a draft of this Article 
suggested to me that DOMA was unnecessary because such declaratory judg-
ments are not enforceable against nonparties. Even if this were true, DOMA’s 
rule still would be of use were the parties to divorce; a jurisdiction opposed to 
same-sex marriage need not enforce judgments in connection with the dissolu-
tion of such a union. See infra Part IV. Moreover, although judgments gener-
ally do not have res judicata effects against a party who did not participate in 
the prior adjudication, see Baker, 522 U.S. at 237 n.11; Koppleman, supra note 
4, at 17 & n.90, court judgments concerning a person’s status (e.g., nationality, 
paternity) typically apply to nonparties. 
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cited these writers and stated that “it is possible that homosex-
ual couples could obtain a judicial judgment memorializing 
their ‘marriage,’ and then proceed to base their claim of sister-
state recognition on that judicial record.”124 
The suggested strategy—that travelers to Hawaii obtain a 
declaratory judgment—was designed to circumvent the ordi-
nary American rule that the state of residence has virtually ex-
clusive regulatory power over family law matters.125 Thus, this 
strategy constituted an effort to extend Hawaii’s legislative ju-
 
Professor Koppelman similarly has argued that the concern about de-
claratory judgments was not legitimate because “the only kind of proceeding[ ] 
that can generate a judgment entitled to full faith and credit” is a “genuinely 
adversarial proceeding.” Id. This is not wholly correct, for the full faith and 
credit doctrine contains loopholes pursuant to which sister states may be re-
quired to enforce collusive judgments. In the context of divorce proceedings, 
for example, couples who wish to avail themselves of more liberal divorce laws 
than those provided by their home states can travel to the state whose laws 
they wish apply to their marriage, live there for the minimum time needed to 
statutorily qualify as domiciled residents, have one of the parties perfunctorily 
raise the issue of domicile in their divorce proceeding, and walk out of court 
with a divorce judgment that their home state is bound to recognize. See 
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 361–62 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); 
Currie, supra note 61, at 10. In short, the Full Faith and Credit Clause juris-
prudence does not prevent conniving parties from creating collusive judg-
ments, and DOMA was an effort to close this type of loophole. 
 124. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 30. 
 125. When the family unit resides in the same state, then the state of resi-
dence has the legislative jurisdiction to regulate virtually all family matters; 
conversely, nonresident states lack such regulatory powers. Complications 
arise when the family unit is spread among two or more states, as is the case 
when a divorcee moves out of state. The state of residence’s exclusive regula-
tory jurisdiction is true across the spectrum of family law matters. For in-
stance, a state in which neither spouse resides cannot issue a divorce decree 
that binds the state of residence. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 
226, 239 (1945). Similarly, under federal law, a child’s home state presump-
tively has the power to make custody and visitation determinations, and the 
presumption is overridden only if the child has been abandoned or in an 
“emergency” situation where “the child, a sibling, or parent of the child has 
been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738A(c)(2)(A), (C) (2000). Finally, a state in which neither the parent nor 
child resides cannot alter a valid child support order issued by the state in 
which the child or at least one of the parents resides. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(e) 
(2000). 
To anticipate a possible objection, it cannot be said that the “place of cele-
bration rule” is contrary to the proposition that the state of residence has vir-
tually exclusive regulatory power over family matters. See Koppelman, supra 
note 4, at 10 (discussing the “place of celebration rule”). While it is true that 
the “place of celebration rule” provides that marriages are deemed valid by a 
home state if the marriage was legal in the state of celebration, this rule is, 
after all, the law of the home state and is subject to override if the marriage is 
deemed to violate the home state’s public policy. See id. 
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risdiction over matters that the home states more appropriately 
have the power to regulate under well-established American 
law. DOMA’s judgments provision sought to limit illicit extra-
territorial regulation. As such, one could plausibly argue that 
DOMA’s instruction that such judgments need not be enforced 
by sister states is consistent with Supreme Court case law find-
ing judgments reflecting illicit extraterritorial regulations out-
side the ambit of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.126 
2. DOMA as a Public Policy Exception 
Even if DOMA is a public policy exception, there are two 
important distinctions between DOMA and the instances where 
the Court has rejected invocations of the public policy excep-
tion. 
First, in all cases where the Court rejected the invocation 
of public policy to avoid the enforcement of judgments, it has 
been the efforts of state officials that were rebuffed.127 DOMA is 
different in this regard because it is a decision by Congress, a 
distinction that may well matter. The Court has explained its 
rejection of state invocations of the public policy exception on 
the basis of the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s goal of “‘trans-
forming an aggregation of independent sovereign States into a 
nation.’”128 Permitting each state to invoke the public policy ex-
ception as it wishes would have a greater centrifugal force on 
the Union than allowing Congress to identify discrete circum-
stances under which states may do so. After all, state officials 
are responsible for advancing the interests of their states and 
are not expected to think more broadly about national inter-
ests, whereas we expect Congress to act with the national in-
terest in mind. Structurally, whereas states cannot be expected 
to account for the externalities they impose on other states (by 
refusing to apply nonforum law, for instance), Congress com-
 
 126. To be sure, DOMA’s language does not apply only to declaratory 
judgments but instead is broad enough to encompass judgments that do not 
reflect problematic extraterritorial regulation. In my view, however, DOMA 
should be construed in a narrow manner that does not embrace such judg-
ments. See infra Part III.D.1. 
 127. See, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948); Magnolia Petroleum 
Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438 (1943), overruled by Thomas v. Wash. Gas 
Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); cf. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908) 
(holding that the judgment of a Missouri court was entitled to full faith and 
credit in Mississippi despite the fact that the Missouri judgment rested on an 
erroneous application of Mississippi law). 
 128. Baker, 522 U.S. at 234 (quoting Sherrer, 334 U.S. at 355). 
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prises all interested parties and therefore is more likely to take 
account of all costs that a given rule imposes on states. These 
very considerations can explain why the dormant Commerce 
Clause’s prohibition against the enactment of protectionist leg-
islation extends to the states but not to Congress.129 Thus, 
while it is eminently sensible that we would not want to leave 
the job of “transforming an aggregation of independent, sover-
eign States into a nation”130 to the states, the same cannot be 
said about relying on Congress to aid in creating the Union and 
determining the appropriate degree of autonomy to be retained 
by the states. 
A second distinction between DOMA and the Court’s public 
policy jurisprudence is that case law has rejected the existence 
of a “ubiquitous” or “roving” public policy exception.131 To the 
extent DOMA is conceptualized in public policy terms, DOMA 
announces a tightly confined exception, restricted to judgments 
in connection with same-sex marriage. A limited public policy 
exception is less threatening to the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause’s goal of creating a union than a “ubiquitous” exception. 
This is suggested by the fact that although case law long has 
explained why the enforcement of sister-state judgments is par-
ticularly crucial for the creation and maintenance of our coun-
try’s union,132 there nonetheless are several discrete types of 
judgments that need not be enforced.133 
In short, because DOMA is a congressionally created dis-
crete exception to the general obligation to enforce sister-state 
judgments, it is plausible to conclude that DOMA does not alter 
any preexisting judicially created full faith and credit rules. 
D. ASSERTIONS OF SUPREME COURT SUPREMACY 
Professor Tribe calls DOMA unconstitutional because the 
Effects Clause does not authorize Congress to determine that 
certain acts or judgments need have no effect. Dean Kramer 
and Professors Koppelman and Sack each assert that DOMA 
exceeds Congress’s power because it seeks to “dilute” full faith 
 
 129. See Rosen, supra note 97, at 1573. 
 130. Baker, 522 U.S. at 234. 
 131. Id. at 233–34. 
 132. See, e.g., id. at 233 (noting that the “Full Faith and Credit Clause ‘or-
dered submission . . . even to hostile policies reflected in the judgment of an-
other State, because the practical operation of the federal system, which the 
Constitution, designed, demanded it’” (quoting Estin, 334 U.S. at 546)). 
 133. See supra Part II.C.1. 
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and credit’s requirements. This subsection shows that the “no 
effect” and “dilution” arguments amount to the same unargued 
claim that the Supreme Court has the primary and last word in 
respect of determining full faith and credit’s requirements. Part 
III of the Article forthrightly considers each branch’s role with 
regard to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, rejecting the un-
spoken assumption of Supreme Court supremacy that under-
writes Kramer’s, Koppleman’s, and Sack’s apparently disparate 
arguments. 
1. No Effect is Not an “Effect” 
Professor Tribe argues that the Effects Clause cannot be 
read to authorize Congress to “licens[e] States to give no effect 
at all to a specific category of ‘Acts, Records and Proceed-
ings.’”134 According to Tribe, construing “prescribe . . . the Ef-
fect”135 to include the power to declare that no effect need be 
given is “a play on words, not a legal argument.”136 Rather, 
it is as plain as words can make it [that] the congressional power to 
“prescribe . . . the effect” of sister-state acts, records, and proceedings, 
within the context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, includes no 
congressional power to prescribe that some acts, records and proceed-
ings that would otherwise be entitled to full faith and credit under the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause as judicially interpreted shall instead be 
entitled to no faith or credit at all!137 
To begin, Tribe’s construction of the word “effect” is not self 
evident. Precisely why can’t the power to “prescribe . . . the Ef-
fect” include the power to say that something has no effect?138 
Tribe does not suggest that such a construction violates linguis-
tic conventions (as indeed it does not), but justifies his conclu-
sion on the basis of the “context of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.”139 He asserts that those who advocate that Congress 
has the power to determine that a public act or judgment is en-
titled to no faith or credit would confer on Congress a “sort of 
 
 134. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5932. 
 135. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 136. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5932.  
 137. Id. 
 138. For similar arguments, see The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 
1740 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 58 (1996) [hereinafter 
Hearing Letter] (letter from Michael W. McConnell, Professor, University of 
Chicago Law School, to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Comm. on the Judici-
ary (July 10, 1996)); Daniel A. Crane, The Original Understanding of the “Ef-
fects Clause” of Article IV, Section I and Implications for the Defense of Mar-
riage Act, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 307, 313 (1998). 
 139. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5932. 
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nullification authority,” that is, a “congressional license to ig-
nore the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”140 The Effects Clause, 
concludes Tribe, “simply will not bear so tortured a reading.”141 
Careful examination discloses, however, that Tribe’s argu-
ment is not really a textual argument about the meaning of “ef-
fect” nor an argument about the nature of full faith and credit. 
Instead, he makes an implicit claim that only one governmen-
tal institution—the courts—authoritatively determine what full 
faith and credit requires.142 After all, while Tribe states that 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s first sentence is a “self-
executing requirement,”143 he does not criticize the many Su-
preme Court cases identifying public acts (and sometimes even 
judgments) that need not be given effect by sister states. Con-
sider, for example, Pacific Employers, in which the Court held 
that California courts need not apply Massachusetts’s work-
men’s compensation law. Under Tribe’s logic, Pacific Employ-
ers’s conclusion that California need not give effect to the Mas-
sachusetts law would be a “play on words, not a legal 
argument” insofar as the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s “self-
executing”144 first sentence provides that “Full Faith and Credit 
shall be given . . . to the . . . public Acts”145 of other states. 
There are many other cases where the Court has ruled that the 
forum need not apply the law of the nonforum state.146 Unless 
Tribe is willing to reject all cases where the Court held that 
acts and judgments of sister states need not be enforced, it 
must be the case that he understands that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause’s “self-executing” requirement does not mean 
that all the public acts of sister states must be given effect in 
the forum state. Some need not be. 
The important question then becomes which institution de-
termines what acts and judgments fall under the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause’s requirement. Built into Tribe’s argument is 
the unargued conclusion that it is the Supreme Court alone 
that has this power. Reread his argument: 
 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 146. See, e.g., Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 412 (1955); Alaska Packers 
Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 547–48 (1935); Huntington v. 
Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892). 
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it is as plain as words can make it [that] the congressional power to 
‘prescribe . . . the effect’ of sister-state acts, records, and proceedings, 
within the context of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, includes no 
congressional power to prescribe that some acts, records and proceed-
ings that would otherwise be entitled to full faith and credit under the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause as judicially interpreted shall instead be 
entitled to no faith or credit at all!147 
The crucial language in Tribe’s assertion is “as judicially 
interpreted,” which suggests that Congress lacks the power to 
decide that acts entitled to full faith and credit “as judicially in-
terpreted” shall not be given effect. The phrase rescues Tribe’s 
argument from indicting as wrongly decided all of the Court’s 
holdings identifying acts and judgments that need not be given 
effect. At the same time, this language proves that Tribe’s ar-
gument is not really a text-based claim that the power to pre-
scribe effects cannot include the power to decide that an act 
shall have no effect. Instead, Tribe’s argument boils down to 
the unargued assertion that only the Supreme Court has the 
power to say that a state can give no effect to an act or judg-
ment. Unfortunately, Tribe does not justify what turns out to 
be his unspoken major premise concerning judicial supremacy 
in the determination of what the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
requires. 
2. Dilution 
Another critique several commentators level is that DOMA 
exceeded Congress’s powers under the Effects Clause because 
DOMA dilutes the quantum of credit that the Supreme Court 
determined is required. The no-dilution constraint can be 
traced to Justice Stevens’s 1980 plurality opinion in Thomas v. 
Washington Gas Light Co., which indicated in dicta that “there 
is at least some question whether Congress may cut back on 
the measure of faith and credit required by a decision of this 
Court.”148 Dean Kramer provides a possible textual basis for 
 
 147. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5932. 
 148. 448 U.S. 261, 273 n.18 (1980) (plurality opinion). The plurality’s com-
ments are dictum because the Thomas case did not analyze the scope of a con-
gressional enactment under the Effects Clause but instead concerned the 
question of whether one state must give res judicata effect to a workmen’s 
compensation claim issued by another state’s administrative agency. Id. at 
286. 
The Thomas plurality opinion also opined that “Congress clearly has the 
power to increase the measure of faith and credit that a State must accord to 
the laws or judgments of another State.” Id. at 273 n.18. Though beyond the 
scope of this Article, I believe there are strong reasons to question this conclu-
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the view that Congress does not have the power to reduce the 
credit that the Supreme Court indicated must be given to a 
public act, judicial proceeding, or record. Kramer notes that the 
Clause’s first sentence provides that “full faith and credit shall 
be given.”149 He argues that “[t]his unqualified ‘full’ and man-
datory ‘shall’ lose some (though obviously not all) of their mean-
ing if Congress can simply legislate the requirement away or 
relieve states of whatever obligations the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause imposes.”150 From this, Kramer concludes that 
it is more credible to read the Full Faith and Credit Clause as impos-
ing a mandatory requirement of faith and credit (defined by the Su-
preme Court), with the Effects Clause authorizing Congress to enact 
whatever national legislation is needed to refine and implement it. 
Refine and implement, not undermine or abolish—which means that 
even federal legislation must be tested against, and shown to be con-
sistent with, the core requirements of full faith and credit.151 
This interpretation of the Effects Clause is one of the predi-
cates for Kramer’s conclusion that DOMA is unconstitu-
tional.152 
To begin, the dilution argument fails if DOMA’s rules are 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent, as I argued above.153 
Beyond this, careful analysis shows that the no-dilution-power 
theory collapses into the unargued conclusion that the Supreme 
Court appropriately determines what the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause requires. Kramer’s dilution argument, like Tribe’s “no 
effects” position, on closer examination turns out to be an unar-
gued claim for judicial supremacy. To see this, let us reformu-
late Kramer’s question by substituting “the Supreme Court” for 
“Congress” and ask whether the “unqualified ‘full’ and manda-
tory ‘shall’ lose some . . . of their meaning” if the Supreme Court 
can simply interpret “away or relieve states of whatever obliga-
tions the Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes.” If Kramer is 
correct that the requirement that “full” faith and credit “shall 
be given” means that all acts and judgments from sister states 
must be given full effect, then all of the Court’s decisions identi-
fying some acts or judgments that need not be given effect in 
sister states cause the Full Faith and Credit Clause to “lose 
some” of its meaning in the same way that DOMA purportedly 
 
sion. For one argument, see Sack, supra note 104, at 893–95. 
 149. See Kramer, supra note 4, at 2003. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 2007–08. 
 153. See supra Part II.C. 
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does. Kramer, however, has not rejected as wrongly decided all 
cases in which the Supreme Court determined that particular 
acts or judgments need not be given effect in sister states. If the 
critique Kramer levels does not apply to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Pacific Employers (for instance), then that is only 
because Kramer assumes that the Court properly undertakes 
the role of authoritatively interpreting the obligations that the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes.154 
The assumption concerning judicial supremacy in deter-
mining the meaning of the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s re-
quirements underlies the dilution analysis other scholars also 
provide.155 This is not surprising because the concept of dilution 
necessarily presumes the existence of a baseline. None of the 
advocates of the “dilution” constraint on Congress’s powers 
suggests that all acts, judgments, and records must be given 
 
 154. Dean Kramer does not provide a full-blown account of why the Su-
preme Court properly assumes this hegemonic function in the interpretation 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. In his more recent scholarship, however, 
Kramer advances the view that societal actors apart from the Supreme Court, 
including Congress, play important roles in authoritatively determining what 
the Constitution means. See KRAMER, supra note 34, at 233–48. Thus, it is 
possible that Kramer’s views regarding Congress’s role in interpreting what 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires have shifted. 
 155. For example, Professor Koppelman argues that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause’s first sentence is a “clear, self-executing command” and that 
the Effects Clause “should not be read in a way that contradicts the first. The 
grant of power is thus limited by its context: Congress may not exercise its Ef-
fects Clause powers in a way that contradicts the self-executing command.” 
Koppelman, supra note 4, at 20–21. Unless Koppelman dismisses as wrongly 
decided all Supreme Court decisions holding that a forum need not apply the 
acts and judgments of sister states—and there is no evidence that this is what 
Koppelman thinks—his critique assumes that the Supreme Court has the 
power to define the minimum full faith and credit baselines. Similarly, Profes-
sor Sack argues that “[t]he strongest argument for opponents of DOMA” is 
that “Congress did not have the power to diminish the Constitution’s Full 
Faith and Credit requirements with legislation such as DOMA.” Sack, supra 
note 104, at 891–92; see also id. at 895 (“The history and purpose of the [Full 
Faith and Credit] Clause provide convincing evidence that Congress cannot 
dilute the Full Faith and Credit mandates of the Constitution.”). Professor 
Sack’s formulation implicitly equates the Court’s full faith and credit doctrine 
with “the Constitutional Full Faith and Credit requirements.” Id. at 891–92. 
Professor Singer’s critique of DOMA likewise treats Supreme Court case law 
as being metonymic with the constitutional protection of full faith and credit. 
See Singer, supra note 7, at 44 (relying on a Supreme Court case for the propo-
sition that “[b]efore the federal DOMA, it was fixed constitutional law that 
states must enforce the final judgments of other states even if those judgments 
violate the forum’s strong public policy” and concluding that “[t]o allow Con-
gress to reverse this principle is to allow a statute to repeal part of the Consti-
tution”). 
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effect by sister states or that the many Supreme Court cases 
that did not require forum states to give effect to the laws of 
sister states were wrongly decided.156 The notion that the Ef-
fects Clause does not permit Congress to “dilute” the require-
ments of full faith and credit accordingly is inseparable from 
the assumption that the Supreme Court alone appropriately 
determines the baseline Full Faith and Credit Clause require-
ments that may not be congressionally diminished. Below, I 
identify the various governmental institutions that properly 
play a role in determining this baseline.157 
III.  CONGRESS’S POWER TO ENACT DOMA: 
UNDERSTANDING THE ROLES OF CONGRESS, THE 
PRESIDENT, AND THE COURTS IN DETERMINING WHAT 
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT REQUIRES 
Even if DOMA authorized states to refuse to enforce judg-
ments that Supreme Court precedent indicated had to be en-
forced, it would not ineluctably follow that DOMA is unconsti-
tutional. DOMA’s constitutionality would turn on Congress’s 
and the President’s roles in determining what full faith and 
credit requires. Moreover, as shown above, many of the argu-
ments propounded by DOMA critics are premised on the un-
stated conclusion that the Supreme Court appropriately has 
the final word in determining full faith and credit’s require-
ments.158 This Part of the Article accordingly considers the role 
that governmental actors apart from the Supreme Court should 
play in determining what the Full Faith and Credit Clause re-
quires. Section A sketches the two approaches that scholars 
and congresspersons to date have taken to this question. Lay-
ing them side-by-side suggests that there is an intermediate 
path. Sections B and C identify and defend this middle path, an 
 
 156. See supra note 155. 
 157. See infra Part III.B. 
 158. This assumption underwrites the criticism of DOMA propounded by 
Professor Tribe that the constitutional grant of the power to declare the “Ef-
fect thereof” cannot include the power to determine that some acts or judicial 
proceedings need not be given effect. See Tribe letter, supra note 63, at S5932; 
supra Part II.D.1. Similarly, arguments that Congress does not have the 
power to dilute the requirements of full faith and credit (including those by 
Dean Kramer, see Kramer, supra note 4, at 2003, Professor Koppelman, see 
Koppelman, supra note 4, at 20–21, and Professor Sack, see Sack, supra note 
104, at 895) implicitly assume that the Supreme Court is responsible for de-
termining the baseline requirements of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See 
supra Part II.D.2. 
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approach under which Congress and the President have broad 
powers under the Effects Clause, including the power to pre-
scribe choice-of-law rules that differ from those identified by 
the Supreme Court. Sections B and C also explain the impor-
tant role courts continue to have in developing full faith and 
credit doctrine. Section D applies the principles developed in 
Sections B and C to DOMA. 
A. APPROACHES ALREADY TAKEN 
Scholars’ and politicians’ approaches to determining the 
scope of Congress’s Effects Clause powers can usefully be di-
vided into two general groups.159 The first reflects the view that 
Congress is the ultimate arbiter of what effect need be given to 
the acts, records, and judicial proceedings of sister states. Call 
this the “Congressional Supremacy” approach. During floor de-
bate of DOMA, for example, Senator Gramm argued that one 
“need only read the second sentence of article IV, section 1 of 
the Constitution to see that Congress has the only role in pre-
scribing the circumstance under which one State must recog-
nize a marriage that occurs in another State.”160 In a letter to 
Senator Hatch during DOMA’s debate, Professor (now Judge) 
Michael McConnell similarly argued that the Effects Clause 
“does not give Congress power to make laws necessary and 
proper for the ‘enforcement’ of state laws in other states, or for 
carrying those laws into ‘execution.’ Instead, Congress is given 
full power to ‘prescribe’ their ‘effect.’”161 
To “prescribe the effect” of something is to determine what effect it 
will have. In the absence of powerful evidence to the contrary, the 
natural meaning of these words is that Congress can prescribe that a 
particular class of acts will have no effect at all, or that their effect 
will be confined to their state of origin.162 
Proponents of this approach view Congress’s plenary power 
as “encompassing both expansion and contraction” of effect that 
a forum must give to another state’s acts or judgments under 
 
 159. Professor Douglas Laycock has offered an approach to the Effects 
Clause that does not fit into either of these categories and with which I largely 
concur. See Laycock, supra note 96, at 301–33, discussed infra Part III.C.4.a. 
 160. 142 CONG. REC. S10106 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Gramm) (emphasis added); see also id. at S10116 (statement of Sen. Burns) 
(referring to the Effects Clause and stating that “the Framers of the Constitu-
tion had the foresight to give Congress the discretion to create exceptions to 
the mandate contained in the Full Faith and Credit Clause”). 
 161. Hearing Letter, supra note 138, at 58. 
 162. Id. at 57. 
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the case law.163 Though not completely clear, proponents of the 
plenary power position appear to take the position that Con-
gress’s determinations under the Effects Clause cannot be re-
viewed by the Supreme Court.164 Then-Professor McConnell, for 
instance, wrote that Congress is “the ultimate umpire” in de-
termining what effect one state’s laws, records, and judgments 
have in another state.165 Similarly, as noted above, Senator 
Gramm stated on the Senate floor that Congress has the “sole” 
role in determining the extraterritorial effects of one state’s 
acts, records, and judicial proceedings.166 
The second approach conceptualizes a far more circum-
scribed congressional role in determining what the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause requires. Under this view, Congress has 
power to legislate only with respect to matters about which the 
Supreme Court has not provided a full faith and credit rule. 
Call this the “Interstitial Power” approach. 
There are three variants of the “Interstitial Power” ap-
proach. One group of scholars thinks that the Effects Clause 
“authorizes Congress to enforce the clause’s self-executing re-
quirements [only] insofar as judicial enforcement alone, as 
overseen by the Supreme Court, might reasonably be deemed 
insufficient.”167 A second position is that the Court’s holdings 
determine the minimal amount of respect owed to sister-state 
acts and judgments but that Congress can require more. Exem-
plary of this approach is Professor Cass Sunstein’s statement 
before Congress during hearings for DOMA that Congress can 
“expand[] the reach of state rules and judgments” as defined by 
 
 163. 142 CONG. REC. S10110 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Byrd); see also Crane, supra note 138, at 315 (“[T]he Full Faith and Credit 
Clause serves as a constitutional default provision in the absence of congres-
sional legislation.”). 
 164. See Kramer, supra note 4, at 2002 (describing the plenary power posi-
tion as the understanding that the full faith and credit rules identified by the 
Court “have the status of federal common law and can thus be displaced by 
Congress, which has nearly unlimited power under the Effects Clause to pre-
scribe alternative rules”). 
 165. Hearing Letter, supra note 138, at 58. McConnell comes to this con-
clusion by arguing that there is no principled distinction between increasing 
and diminishing the effect of a state’s law. 
 166. See 142 CONG. REC. S10106 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of 
Sen. Gramm). 
 167. Tribe Letter, supra note 63, at S5932; see also Kramer, supra note 4, 
at 2003 (arguing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause “impose[es] a manda-
tory requirement of faith and credit (defined by the Supreme Court), with the 
Effects Clause authorizing Congress to enact whatever national legislation is 
needed to refine and implement it”). 
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the Court, but not diminish it.168 A third position denies Con-
gress the power to expand the scope of what the Court has re-
quired. For instance, Senator Kennedy argued on the Senate 
floor that “[t]he Constitution gives Congress no power to add or 
subtract from the full faith and credit clause.”169 Similarly, Pro-
fessor Sack argues that “Congress does not have plenary power 
either to dilute or expand full faith and credit beyond what the 
Court has delineated as the Constitution’s mandate” and that 
Congress only has power to act in the areas “in which the Court 
has not provided clear guidance or has explicitly refused to rule 
on the requirements of the Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.”170 In short, what unites these three approaches is the 
conception that Congress’s power under the Effects Clause is 
limited by Supreme Court full faith and credit case law. 
B. THE PATH NOT TAKEN: THE TEAMWORK MODEL 
As different as they are, both the Congressional Supremacy 
and Interstitial Powers approaches share something crucial in 
common: both vest full responsibility for articulating full faith 
and credit’s requirements in only one governmental institution. 
Though closer in many respects to the Congressional Suprem-
acy approach, the alternative I provide is more collaborative 
than either Congressional Supremacy or Interstitial Powers. I 
shall call it the “Teamwork” model. I hope to show here that the 
Teamwork approach answers most objections that proponents 
of the two contending groups identified above have hurled 
against one another and accordingly is largely immune to the 
criticisms that apply to Congressional Supremacy and Intersti-
tial Powers. Finally, I will argue that the Teamwork model is 
functionally sound and thus normatively attractive. 
Here is a brief sketch of the Teamwork model, which I 
shall elaborate and fully defend below. Under the Teamwork 
approach, the Effects Clause’s charge that Congress may “pre-
scribe . . . the effect”171 grants plenary power to the political 
branches—meaning both Congress and the President172—to 
 
 168. See The Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing on S. 1740 Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 45 (1996) (prepared statement of Cass R. 
Sunstein, Professor, University of Chicago Law School) (emphasis omitted). 
 169. 142 CONG. REC. S10102 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy). 
 170. Sack, supra note 104, at 832. 
 171. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 172. The President participates, of course, by means of the constitutional 
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legislate and thereby determine what full faith and credit re-
quires.173 This includes the power to decide that a particular 
class of acts, judgments, or judicial proceedings need not be 
given effect. Additionally, case law decided under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause does not diminish this power, but in-
stead is usefully conceptualized as a form of federal common 
law.174 Congress may accordingly disregard the full faith and 
credit rules developed by courts, including the Supreme Court, 
when exercising its powers under the Effects Clause. The Su-
preme Court nonetheless plays a significant role in reviewing 
legislation enacted under the Effects Clause. This legislation 
should be interpreted using a clear statement rule. Where leg-
islation clearly addresses a particular subject matter, judicial 
review should be deferential, asking only whether the legisla-
tion is a reasonable choice-of-law provision. 
In short, as the term suggests, the Teamwork model posits 
that determining what the Full Faith and Credit Clause re-
quires is an undertaking that involves multiple institutions. 
This is not to imply that all institutions have equivalent, or 
even equally important, roles. The Teamwork model anticipates 
that Congress appropriately plays the largest role in fleshing 
out the requirements of full faith and credit. The other players’ 
participation (i.e., the President’s and the courts’) nevertheless 
is essential for the enterprise to function properly. 
C. TEXTUAL, PRECEDENTIAL, AND FUNCTIONAL JUSTIFICATIONS  
This Section identifies textual, precedential, and functional 
support for the Teamwork model. In the process, this Section 
also anticipates and refutes challenges likely posed by Congres-
sional Supremacists and Interstitialists to the Teamwork 
model. 
 
requirements of presentment and return. See generally INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 946–48 (1983) (describing the constitutional requirement of pre-
sentment). 
 173. This constitutes a rejection of the possibility that the Effects Clause’s 
power to “prescribe” refers to nonlegislative powers that accordingly do not re-
quire presidential participation through presentment and are not subject to 
veto. 
 174. As discussed below, one could make a plausible argument that Con-
gress enjoys such powers even if the Court’s full faith and credit rulings are 
considered constitutional law rather than federal common law. See infra Part 
III.C.4.b. 
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1. Text 
Let us start with the text of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. Read on its own, the Effects Clause seems to vest con-
siderable powers in the national legislature when it states that 
Congress has the power to “prescribe . . . the Effect” of acts, re-
cords, and judicial proceedings by means of “general” laws.175 
Most scholarly works penned before passage of DOMA agreed 
that the Effects Clause vested Congress with considerable regu-
latory authority.176 
The Teamwork approach comfortably fits the Effects 
Clause. The Clause makes it constitutionally mandatory that 
one state give full faith and credit to other states’ acts, judicial 
proceedings, and records, but authorizes Congress to “pre-
scribe” the effects and thereby specify what full faith and credit 
requires in various contexts. Such a construction is not inter-
nally contradictory as a textual matter because, as case law 
long has recognized, it is implausible to suggest that full faith 
and credit means that state A’s court inexorably must apply 
state B’s law.177 If full faith and credit cannot plausibly mean 
“apply the other state’s law all the time,” then some institution 
must determine what full faith and credit does mean, and the 
Clause’s second sentence explicitly identifies a congressional 
role in that task. This is not to suggest that courts properly 
play no role in fleshing out full faith and credit’s requirements. 
Federal courts have the power to create rules in the absence of 
congressional action, and, as will be discussed in greater detail 
below, the power to review congressional acts under a deferen-
tial standard that ensures such statutes are reasonable. But, as 
is the case with federal common law generally, any rules laid 
 
 175. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 176. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 96, at 301 (arguing that Congress’s Ef-
fects Clause powers are considerable, noting that “almost everyone agrees that 
[this] includes power to specify choice-of-law rules,” and citing as examples of 
those who agree, Walter Wheeler Cook, The Powers of Congress Under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421, 425–26 (1919); Brainerd Currie, 
Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 227, 266–67 (1958); Michael H. Gottesman, Draining the Dismal Swamp: 
The Case for Federal Choice of Law Statutes, 80 GEO. L.J. 1, 23–28 (1991); and 
Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts: A 
Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33, 80 (1957)). 
 177. See Alaska Packer Ass’n v. Indus. Accident Comm’n of Cal., 294 U.S. 
532, 547 (1935) (“A rigid and literal enforcement of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, without regard to the statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd 
result that, wherever the conflict arises, the statute of each state must be en-
forced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.”). 
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down by federal courts before Congress acts do not displace 
congressional power. 
Importantly, the textual argument provided here insulates 
the Teamwork approach from a text-based critique to which the 
Congressional Supremacy approach is vulnerable. Many Con-
gressional Supremacists argue that the Effects Clause grants 
Congress the power to make “exceptions” to what the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause requires.178 Interstitialists understandably 
ask how this position squares with the Effects Clause’s re-
quirement that “full” faith and credit “shall” be given.179 The 
Teamwork approach’s perspective on this debate is that the 
Congressional Supremacists implicitly, and mistakenly, con-
cede that courts alone are responsible for determining what full 
faith and credit means. The better approach is to understand 
the Effects Clause as authorizing Congress to play a role in de-
termining what full faith and credit itself requires, not as 
granting congressional power to make exceptions to what 
Court-defined full faith and credit requires. 
Interstitialists undoubtedly would argue that the Team-
work model, like the Congressional Supremacy model, under-
mines the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s requirement that 
“Full Faith and Credit . . . shall be given.”180 Such Interstitialist 
criticism is subject to three responses. First, the mere fact that 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause utilizes unqualified, categori-
cal language (“full,” “shall”) does not mean that it must give 
rise to a categorical constitutional requirement. After all, other 
categorical constitutional language has begotten noncategorical 
constitutional requirements. For instance, notwithstanding the 
First Amendment’s categorical declaration that “Congress shall 
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,”181 Congress 
 
 178. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 26 (1996), as reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2930 (“While full faith and credit is the rule—that is, while 
States are generally obligated to treat laws of other States as they would their 
own—Congress retains a discretionary power to carve out such exceptions as it 
deems appropriate.” (emphasis added)); 142 CONG. REC. S10116 (daily ed. 
Sept. 10, 1996) (statement of Sen. Burns) (“[T]he Framers of the Constitution 
had the foresight to give Congress the discretion to create exceptions to the 
mandate contained in the ‘Full Faith and Credit Clause.’”); id. at S10110 
(statement of Sen. Byrd) (“[I]t is not at all clear why a general empowering of 
Congress to ‘prescribe . . . the effect’ of public acts does not give it discretion to 
define the ‘effect’ so that a particular public act is not due full faith and 
credit.” (emphasis added)). 
 179. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 4, at 2002–03. 
 180. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 181. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
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can prohibit political speech that occurs outside of polling 
places,182 and states may ban certain hate speech.183 Similarly, 
notwithstanding the First Amendment’s guaranty that gov-
ernment “shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise” of 
religion,184 Congress may enact laws that criminalize activities 
that are part of a religious community’s worship and accord-
ingly hinder the religious community’s ability to freely practice 
its religion.185 The fact that other constitutional provisions with 
the categorical language of “shall” have not been construed to 
generate categorical constitutional protections blunts Intersti-
tialist criticisms that the Congressional Supremacist and 
Teamwork models do not give categorically “full” credit to sister 
states’ acts, records, and judicial proceedings. 
Second, the Interstitialist position itself does violence to 
the constitutional text. The Interstitialist claim that Congress’s 
legislative power is what remains after the Supreme Court has 
acted conflicts with the Clause’s apparently unconditional 
grant to Congress of the power to “prescribe . . . the effect” of 
acts, records, and judgments.186 
Third, the Interstitialist approach condemns a long line of 
Supreme Court precedent. Interstitialists who accept currently 
decided Supreme Court case law that permits a forum to not 
apply a sister-state act or judgment are vulnerable to the same 
criticism they presumably would hurl at Teamwork model ad-
vocates (and that they already throw at Congressional Su-
premacists). This case law literally allows one state not to give 
“full” faith and credit to another state’s public acts and judg-
ments. To hold true to their strict textual approach, Intersti-
tialists must denounce this entire line of precedent. All things 
being equal, a construction of constitutional language that does 
not suggest that more than a century of Supreme Court juris-
prudence is wrongly decided is preferable to an interpretation 
that does. 
 
 182. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992). 
 183. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362 (2003) (noting that “the First 
Amendment permits content discrimination based on the very reasons why the 
particular class of speech at issue . . . is proscribable” (citation omitted)). 
 184. U. S. CONST. amend. I. 
 185. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876 (1990) (uphold-
ing Oregon’s ban on peyote use against claims that its use was part of the 
plaintiffs’ religious practices); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 
(1878) (upholding a congressional ban on polygamy against claims that it was 
a religious practice). 
 186. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
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For these three reasons, the Interstitialist position is less 
compelling on textual grounds than the Teamwork model. 
2. Precedent 
DOMA is only the fifth congressional enactment pursuant 
to the Effects Clause,187 and none of the previous four has been 
constitutionally challenged on Effects Clause grounds. We con-
sequently are without Supreme Court precedent as to the ex-
tent of Congress’s powers under that Clause. 
On numerous occasions, however, the Court has indicated 
in dicta that Congress has the power under the Effects Clause 
to create full faith and credit rules that differ from those that 
the Court itself has identified. In the relatively recent case of 
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, for example, the Court decided that a 
forum state that was constitutionally obligated to apply nonfo-
rum law nonetheless could apply the forum state’s statute of 
limitations.188 The Court, per Justice Scalia, rejected the mod-
ern view that statutes of limitations are substantive, which 
would have led to the conclusion that the nonforum state’s 
statute of limitations had to be applied, and instead held that 
the historical understanding that statutes of limitations are 
procedural governed for purposes of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.189 The Court nonetheless went on to state that “[i]f cur-
rent conditions render it desirable that forum States no longer 
treat a particular issue as procedural for conflict of laws pur-
poses . . . it can be proposed that Congress legislate to that ef- 
 
 
 187. The other statutes are the 1790 implementing statute directing that 
“[a]cts, records and judicial proceedings . . . so authenticated, shall have the 
same full faith and credit in every court within the United States . . . as they 
have by law or usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they are 
taken,” see Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 947 (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. §1738 (2000)); an 1804 Act that provided a method for authenticat-
ing nonjudicial records, see Act of March 27, 1804, ch. 56, 2 Stat. 298; the Pa-
rental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, see Pub. L. No. 96-611, §§ 6–10, 94 
Stat. 3569 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §1738A (2000)); the Full Faith 
and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, see Pub. L. No. 103-383, 104 Stat. 
4064 (1994) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §1738B (2000)); and the Vio-
lence Against Women Act’s full faith and credit provision, see Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 40221, 108 
Stat. 1930 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. §2265 (2005)), which requires 
sister states to recognize and enforce a valid protection order issued by an-
other state. See generally Sack, supra note 104, at 876–77 (describing these 
Acts). 
 188. Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988). 
 189. See id. at 728–29. 
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fect under the second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.”190 
Sun Oil’s dictum is inconsistent with those Interstitialists 
who posit that Congress can legislate only with regard to mat-
ters that have not been addressed by the Court. The dictum 
does not contradict Congressional Supremacists or the Team-
work approach, but nor does it fully support these approaches. 
This is so because the type of legislation that the dictum in-
vited would have required the forum state to give more effect to 
sister-state law than the Sun Oil rule required: Sun Oil did not 
require the forum to apply a sister state’s statute of limitations 
but invited Congress to so mandate.191 The Sun Oil dictum ac-
cordingly does not provide any guidance with regard to the 
question of whether Congress can authorize states to give less 
effect to a sister state’s act or judgment than Supreme Court 
precedent requires. 
In fact, there are diverging views in Supreme Court opin-
ions as to whether Congress can authorize the forum state to 
give less credit to a foreign judgment than case law otherwise 
provides. Justice Stone was of the view that Congress had such 
powers, writing in dissent in Yarborough v. Yarborough: 
  The mandatory force of the full faith and credit clause as defined 
by this Court may be, in some degree not yet fully defined, expanded 
or contracted by Congress . . . . The constitutional provision giving 
Congress power to prescribe the effect to be given to acts, records and 
proceedings would have been quite unnecessary had it not been in-
tended that Congress should have a latitude broader than that given 
the courts by the full faith and credit clause alone.192 
 
 190. Id. at 729. This opinion was handed down before the Court decided 
City of Boerne v. Flores, in which the Court determined that Congress’s powers 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment do not include the power to leg-
islate in accordance with congressional understandings of the first four sec-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment that differ from the Court’s interpreta-
tions. 521 U.S. 507, 519, 536 (1997). Boerne does not undermine the argument 
here as to Congress’s powers under the Effects Clause for two reasons. First, 
statutory nullification of the Supreme Court’s full faith and credit determina-
tions may be best conceptualized as congressional displacement of federal com-
mon law rather than congressional reinterpretation of what full faith and 
credit means as a matter of constitutional law. See infra text accompanying 
notes 204–11. Second, even if the Court’s full faith and credit decisions are 
viewed as articulating constitutional rules, the Boerne line of cases may be 
distinguished: where the Constitution textually limits Congress’s powers to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, congressional powers under the Effects 
Clause can more plausibly be considered plenary. See Hearing Letter, supra 
note 138, at 58. 
 191. See Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 728–29. 
 192. 290 U.S. 202, 215 n.2 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting). 
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On the other hand, a plurality opinion in the 1980 case of 
Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. indicated in dicta that 
“there is at least some question whether Congress may cut back 
on the measure of faith and credit required by a decision of this 
Court.”193 In short, the Supreme Court has not yet provided 
clear guidance, even in dicta, regarding the scope of congres-
sional power under the Effects Clause. 
3. Functionalist Considerations 
The strongest justification for the Teamwork model’s rejec-
tion of judicial supremacy in the formulation of full faith and 
credit’s requirements rests on functionalist considerations. The 
Full Faith and Credit Clause does not aim to maximize one 
value, but instead mediates among a set of incommensurable 
considerations that sometimes conflict: nearly a century of case 
law has made clear that the Clause aims not just to unify the 
states, but to generate a federal system in which differences 
among the subfederal polities are accommodated so that they 
can remain meaningfully empowered, distinct political enti-
ties.194 
How are the competing considerations of respecting states’ 
distinctiveness and unifying the country to be harmonized? 
Careful thought suggests that there is no single a priori correct 
way to do so; rather, determining how to harmonize these com-
peting considerations is a highly subjective, identity-defining 
activity. This is so because the competing considerations of pre-
serving state autonomy and unifying the country are not re-
ducible to a common metric and hence are incommensurable. 
To fully understand this, it is necessary to refine the philoso-
phical concept of incommensurability. When goods are com-
mensurable, there are clear-cut choices among them with re-
spect to which all rational actors would agree. For example, a 
single five-dollar bill readily can be evaluated in relation to 
 
 193. 448 U.S. 261, 273 n.18 (1980) (plurality). These comments are dictum 
because Thomas did not analyze the scope of a congressional enactment under 
the Effects Clause but instead concerned the question of whether one state 
must give res judicata effect to a workmen’s compensation claim that had been 
issued by another state’s administrative agency. See id. at 286. The plurality 
opinion in Thomas also opined that “Congress clearly has the power to in-
crease the measure of faith and credit that a State must accord to the laws or 
judgments of another State.” Id. at 273 n.18. Though beyond the scope of this 
Article, I believe there are strong reasons to question this conclusion. For one 
argument, see Sack, supra note 104, at 893–95. 
 194. See supra discussion at Part II.A. 
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three one-dollar bills, and everyone would agree that, in the or-
dinary case,195 the former is more valuable than the latter.196 
Incommensurability, by contrast, concerns the choice between 
(or among) options that cannot be reduced to a single, all-
encompassing metric that permits comparisons with which all 
rational agents would agree.197 Incommensurability accordingly 
describes the arena of choice in which subjective evaluations 
must be made. Choosing among incommensurables amounts to 
a process of prioritizing competing commitments. As such, the 
choice can well be understood as defining the very character of 
the person or polity making the decision.198 In the context at 
hand, how the full faith and credit doctrine harmonizes the 
competing considerations of state autonomy and unifying the 
nation is an important determinant of the very character of our 
nation’s federal system. 
The question then becomes what governmental institutions 
are suited to making such determinations. Congress and the 
President are the strongest candidates. Ruling out the alterna-
tives clarifies why this is so. To begin, the states are not well 
suited to making such determinations because they are not de-
signed to take into account national interests; state govern-
ments, including state courts, are devised to look out for state 
 
 195. This excludes, for instance, a dollar bill that has been signed by a ce-
lebrity. 
 196. Cf. Brett G. Scharffs, Adjudication and the Problems of Incom-
mensurability, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1367, 1412–15 (2001) (speaking of the 
incontestable goal of “maximizing” when deciding among commensurable mat-
ters); see also id. at 1428–29 (“[I]f there is only one value that ultimately mat-
ters, then rationality will compel a practical decision maker to seek and choose 
the option that will realize the most of that value. From this view, practical 
reason is entirely a matter of calculation.”). 
 197. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Incommensurability and Agency, in INCOM-
MENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 110, 110 (Ruth 
Chang ed., 1997) (“Incommensurability is the absence of a common measure.”); 
Scharffs, supra note 196, at 1390–91 (stating that incommensurability arises 
when “everything that matters about two competing options can[not] be ex-
pressed in terms of a common value”).  
 198. Other commentators have made similar accounts of incommensurabil-
ity. See, e.g., Elijah Millgram, Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning, in 
INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra 
note 197, at 151, 151–69 (focusing on individual decision making under cir-
cumstances of incommensurability); Raz, supra note 197, at 110–28 (arguing 
that choice, not rationality, governs the selection among incommensurables); 
Charles Taylor, Leading a Life, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, 
AND PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 197, at 170, 170–83 (arguing that justified 
choice among incomparables can be made by analyzing how the competing 
goods fit within the “shape” of a persons life). 
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interests. These concerns give rise to the dormant Commerce 
Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clause doctrines that 
limit the extent to which states can regulate in ways that affect 
American citizens that are not citizens of the regulating 
state.199 Because polities cannot be trusted to guard the inter-
ests of noncitizens—who have no political voice through vot-
ing—states cannot be trusted to make the extraterritoriality 
determinations that lie at the heart of full faith and credit doc-
trine. 
When choosing among the possible federal entities, Con-
gress and the President are particularly well suited for deter-
mining how to harmonize the competing commitments of unify-
ing while still maintaining meaningful differences among 
subfederal polities. Most importantly, because harmonizing 
incommensurable commitments is an intrinsically subjective 
and identity-forming activity, decision making of this sort falls 
more to the political branches of government than to the judici-
ary. Moreover, the legislative process, which involves congres-
sional and presidential participation, is structured such that 
both state and national interests are considered:200 congress-
persons are elected on statewide or substate-wide bases rather 
than a national basis yet are institutionally expected to con-
sider the national interest. The President is elected by a con-
stituency that is simultaneously nationwide and state-based. 
By contrast, the process by which federal judges are selected 
and the life tenure they enjoy does not suggest that they are 
apt to give due consideration to both state and federal inter-
ests. Instead, by virtue of their identities as federal officials 
and their predominantly federal case law, federal judges are 
likely to systematically favor federal over state considerations. 
This is not to suggest that federal courts have no role to 
play in determining full faith and credit’s requirements—they 
do. One of their most important roles was creating a century of 
jurisprudence that has teased out the underlying principles 
implicated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause. The intense 
analysis of highly fact-specific circumstances frequently facili-
 
 199. See generally Rosen, supra note 115, at 897–930 (reviewing constitu-
tional provisions that limit state’s extraterritorial regulatory powers). 
 200. See generally Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 
528, 550–54 (1985) (discussing the composition of the federal government and 
its effect on preserving states’ interests). Of course, to accept that Congress is 
structured in a manner that takes account of states’ interests is not necessar-
ily to conclude that there is no role for judicial oversight via the Tenth 
Amendment. But see id. at 537–55. 
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tates excavation of underlying principles; this is a large part of 
the common-law system’s wisdom. 
However, while courts are well suited to identifying under-
lying principles, it does not follow that they are best candidates 
for determining how to fit the principles together. This is par-
ticularly true where the underlying principles both conflict and 
are incommensurable.201 Foundational democratic principles 
suggest that such highly subjective, identity-determining deci-
sions are best made by the more political branches of govern-
ment. This is particularly true for matters determining the 
character of federalism insofar as the Congress and President 
(as explained above) are more apt than the federal judiciary to 
take account of both national and state interests. These consid-
erations together suggest that there should be highly deferen-
tial judicial review of the political branches’ harmonization of 
incommensurable commitments in the context of full faith and 
credit doctrine. 
Another constructive and institutionally appropriate role 
federal courts can play in the context of determining full faith 
and credit’s requirements is to adopt a standard of review that 
ensures the more political branches have considered how to 
harmonize the competing considerations. After all, it is sensible 
for courts to defer to the political branches’ determinations with 
regard to harmonizing incommensurables only if the political 
branches have actually attempted to do so. A variation on a 
clear statement rule, discussed in greater detail below,202 can 
accomplish this. Indeed, the Court has adopted clear statement 
requirements in several federalism contexts designed to make 
certain that Congress forthrightly indicates its intention to ex-
ercise its unquestionable constitutional powers.203 
 
 201. Though judicial decision making not infrequently requires that courts 
seek to harmonize incommensurable considerations, see generally Scharffs, 
supra note 196, at 1374, that does not mean it is normatively desirable.  
 202. See infra Part III.D.1. 
 203. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64–67 (1989) 
(requiring a clear statement to compel states to entertain damages suits 
against themselves in state courts); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 
U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (holding that abrogation of state sovereign immunity 
must be expressed “in unmistakable language”). See generally William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement 
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992) (noting 
that the Court has created “a series of new ‘super-strong clear statement rules’ 
protecting constitutional structures, especially structures associated with fed-
eralism”). 
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4. Objections to the Teamwork Model  
This subsection anticipates and responds to an obvious ob-
jection to the Teamwork model: that it subverts the ordinary 
system of judicial review under which the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional interpretations are authoritative and final. 
There are two plausible bases for the Teamwork model’s rejec-
tion of judicial supremacy in the context of determining full 
faith and credit’s requirements. One basis relies on well-
established doctrine. The second basis, wholly independent of 
the first, is premised on a normative claim that is at variance 
with some important contemporary doctrine. 
a. Doctrinal Justification  
The first response can be traced to Justice Stone’s dissent 
in Yarborough v. Yarborough,204 for any judicial supremacy ob-
jection would apply equally to Justice Stone’s suggestion that 
Congress may have the power to “expand[]” or “contract[]” 
Court-determined requirements of full faith and credit205 as it 
would to the Teamwork model. The justification he provided in 
support of his conception of congressional power under the Ef-
fects Clause applies to the Teamwork model: there is constitu-
tional text—the Effects Clause—that grants Congress the 
power to determine the “effect” of acts, judgments, and judicial 
proceedings.206 
But how, one might ask, could a constitutional provision 
authorize Congress to essentially overturn Supreme Court de-
cisions? A deeper inquiry into the nature of any such congres-
sional enactments and their relationship to preenactment judi-
cial precedent answers this query, thereby confirming the 
plausibility of Justice Stone’s text-based approach. That is to 
say, what follows is not the primary normative justification for 
the Teamwork approach. Rather, it is a demonstration that the 
Teamwork approach is not sui generis in constitutional law but 
instead can be assimilated to existing doctrine. 
Let us begin by considering what status an enactment pur-
suant to the Effects Clause would have: would it be an ordinary 
statute or a constitutional interpretation by Congress of what 
full faith and credit requires? Careful thought suggests it 
would be at least a statute and perhaps even a constitutional 
 
 204. 290 U.S. 202 (1933). 
 205. Id. at 215 n.2 (Stone, J., dissenting). 
 206. See id. 
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interpretation. Both possibilities are consistent with American 
constitutionalism. 
Start by considering the possibility that a congressional 
enactment would be a mere statute. It is easy enough to under-
stand that the Effects Clause empowers Congress to enact 
statutes that determine the effects of acts, proceedings, or 
judgments. Less obvious is how a statute could effectively over-
rule a Supreme Court decision. The solution is straight for-
ward: statutes would have power to displace Supreme Court 
precedent if the court rulings constitute federal common law 
rather than constitutional rulings.207 As Professor Douglas 
Laycock argues,208 there is a well-established body of federal 
common law—namely, the federal common law the Supreme 
Court has fashioned to “resolve interstate disputes over 
boundaries”—that is conceptually similar to the full faith and 
credit doctrine.209 The underlying commonality is that both in-
terstate border disputes and full faith and credit concern the 
extent of one state’s authority vis-à-vis other states. Determin-
ing state borders is “in its nature a federal question” that Con-
gress has the authority to decide,210 but “in default of legisla-
tion, the Court must create federal common law to resolve such 
disputes.”211 
The same reasoning applies to full faith and credit doc-
trine. Determining when one state must give effect to a sister 
state’s law or judgment by its nature is a federal question be-
cause it turns on deciding the scope of each state’s regulatory 
authority. Congress has the authority to make such determina-
tions under the Effects Clause, and in the absence of congres-
sional action, the Court must fashion rules. Any such court 
rules, however, are subject to congressional revision. The same 
give-and-take between Congress and the Court is found in the 
dormant Commerce Clause context. The Court creates dormant  
 
 
 207. See Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: 
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1975). 
 208. Laycock, supra note 96, at 333. 
 209. Id. For an example of the Supreme Court’s application of this federal 
common law, see Cissna v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 289, 295–97 (1918) (resolving a 
boundary dispute involving the shifting of the Mississippi River). The Court 
has continued to resolve such interstate disputes even after Erie. See, e.g., 
Louisiana v. Mississippi, 516 U.S. 22, 25–28 (1995) (resolving a border dispute 
between Louisiana and Mississippi). 
 210. See Cissna, 246 U.S. at 295–96; see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
 211. Laycock, supra note 96, at 333. 
ROSEN_3FMT 04/18/2006 03:28:45 PM 
2006] DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT 973 
 
Commerce Clause doctrines in situations where Congress has 
not exercised Commerce Clause power it unquestionably en-
joys, and Congress can reverse the Court’s dormant Commerce 
Clause rulings (by, for example, authorizing states to enact pro-
tectionist legislation) when it elects to exercise its Commerce 
Clause powers.212 
Next, consider the possibility that an enactment would 
constitute an instance of congressional constitutional interpre-
tation. There is nothing revolutionary about this possibility.213 
Indeed, Congress’s role in interpreting the Constitution under 
the Teamwork model is less expansive than Congress’s role un-
der well-established doctrine dating back nearly two hundred 
years, now known as the political question doctrine, under 
which Congress is the final and authoritative interpreter of 
several constitutional provisions.214 For instance, it is the Sen-
ate’s sole responsibility to determine what the constitutional 
requirement of “try” means in the context of impeachment pro-
ceedings; courts have no power to even deferentially review the 
Senate’s interpretation.215 One of the factors on which the Su-
preme Court has relied in deciding that the responsibility for 
constitutional interpretation rests with a nonjudicial branch is 
a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the is-
sue to a coordinate political department.”216 The Effects Clause 
seems to be no less explicit an indicator of congressional inter-
pretive responsibility than are other provisions held to be the 
interpretive responsibility of the nonjudicial branches.217 Thus, 
conceptualizing congressional enactments under the Effects 
Clause as instances of congressional constitutional interpreta-
 
 212. See Monaghan, supra note 207, at 16–17. 
 213. For a similar argument to what follows, see Rachel E. Barkow, More 
Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise 
of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 319–23 (2002) (noting the dif-
ferent roles Congress plays in proffering constitutional interpretations as well 
as the “spectrum of deference to the political branches’ interpretation of the 
Constitution”). 
 214. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–37 (1962); Luther v. Bor-
den, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42–43 (1849) (holding that “it rests with Congress” to 
determine the meaning of the Guaranty Clause). 
 215.  Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (holding that the Senate 
alone determines what the Impeachment Trial Clause requires). 
 216. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217. 
 217. See, e.g., Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229–30 (holding that language in the U.S. 
Constitution stating that the “Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Im-
peachments” is a “textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate 
branch”). 
ROSEN_3FMT  04/18/2006 03:28:45 PM 
974 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:915 
 
tion would not require Congress to play an unprecedented ro-
le.218 
Moreover, the nonjudicial branches’ responsibilities for 
constitutional interpretation under the Teamwork model are 
less unusual than those found under the political question doc-
trine because courts still have important roles to play under the 
Teamwork model. The Court is responsible for ensuring by a 
clear statement rule that Congress and the President have 
forthrightly considered how to harmonize the full faith and 
credit doctrine’s competing considerations and applies deferen-
tial review to ensure that any Effects Clause statutes are not 
unreasonable. In fact, congressional and presidential responsi-
bilities under the Teamwork approach are not too different 
from those circumstances in which the Court adopts deferential 
judicial review of legislation.219 After all, ordinary legislation 
proceeds after Congress has made a threshold determination 
that it has the constitutional power to legislate. Deferential ju-
dicial review reflects the Court’s determination that it ought to 
give a benefit of the doubt to Congress’s constitutional judg-
ment as to its constitutional powers.220 Insofar as all legislation 
proceeds from Congress’s interpretation of its own constitu-
tional powers, the nonjudicial branches’ responsibilities in re-
spect of constitutional interpretation under the Teamwork 
model are not that different from the interpretive duties asso-
 
 218. It is true that in these other political question contexts the Court not 
only decides that a constitutional provision is the interpretive responsibility of 
another branch of government but also determines that courts are without the 
power to decide the question. See, e.g., Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229–30. There is no 
particular reason to think, however, that justiciability is a prerequisite for ju-
dicial responsibility in constitutional interpretation. Nonjusticiability is wise if 
courts are institutionally incapable of crafting even an interim solution pend-
ing resolution by the branch ultimately responsible for providing the final and 
authoritative interpretation. If circumstances are such that a default judicial 
rule is better than no rule at all, why shouldn’t courts be permitted to act first 
with the understanding that Congress thereafter may revise their judgments? 
 219. The extent to which the Court actually utilizes deferential review has 
varied over time, and it appears that the Court has been tending to show less 
deference to coordinate branches across wider expanses of constitutional doc-
trine. See Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme 
Court Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73, 79–87 
(2003). 
 220. See id. at 85–87; see also James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of 
the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 135–36 
(1893) (discussing judicial power in relation to legislative power); Felix Frank-
furter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1007–08 (1924) 
(quoting with approval the Thayerian view that Congress’s constitutional in-
terpretations should be given great deference). 
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ciated with run-of-the-mill legislation subject to only deferen-
tial review.221 
To quickly conclude, Justice Stone’s view that the Effects 
Clause may authorize Congress either to expand or contract the 
full faith and credit duties identified by the Court would not 
create an Effects Clause jurisprudence that is wholly sui 
generis. Instead, it generates an approach to the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause that is consistent with other constitutional doc-
trines. Effects Clause enactments plausibly could constitute ei-
ther pure statutes or constitutional interpretations by Con-
gress. Either type of enactment could displace the default rules 
of full faith and credit created by the judiciary that have the 
status of federal common law. 
b. Normative Justification  
Even if the Court’s full faith and credit cases announce 
constitutional rules instead of federal common law, it would not 
ineluctably follow that Congress and the President are without 
the power to act on the basis of their own constitutional inter-
pretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Rather, Congress 
and the President lack the power act only if the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional interpretations trump the nonjudicial 
federal branches’ interpretations. Many scholars have rejected 
this “judicial supremacy” conception, adopting instead the “de-
partmentalist” conception that the judiciary enjoys no special 
interpretive prerogative in constitutional interpretation.222 Un-
der this approach, the other branches of government—
generally the federal government—may rely upon their own 
understandings of the Constitution when they act.223 
The anti-judicial-supremacy argument, however, runs 
 
 221. It might be objected that legislation under the Commerce Clause, for 
example, is different because any constitutional interpretation by Congress 
reflects only a judgment as to its own powers, whereas legislation under the 
Effects Clause represents a judgment about the Constitution’s limitations on 
other polities (i.e., the states). Any such distinction is untenable because Con-
gress’s powers deprive other governmental entities of power by virtue of the 
Tenth Amendment. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155–56 
(1992) (stating that “whether an Act of Congress invades the province of state 
sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment” is a “mirror image[]” of the 
question of “whether an Act of Congress is authorized by one of the powers 
delegated to Congress in . . . the Constitution”). 
 222. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 34, at 106 (explaining the “departmen-
tal” theory). 
 223. Id. 
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afoul of important contemporary case law. Although the well-
known 1966 opinion of Katzenbach v. Morgan224 most plausibly 
is construed as a departmentalist approach within the context 
of Congress’s Section 5 powers under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,225 more recent case law rejects this approach,226 assert-
ing in its place strong judicial supremacy227 in the interpreta-
tion of constitutional law.228 To be sure, one could argue that 
the Court only asserts judicial supremacy in the limited context 
of Section 5, where Congress’s powers are nonplenary.229 As a 
purely positive matter, however, the Court’s Section 5 jurispru-
dence seems to reflect the Court’s current general conception of 
judicial review. Thus, any argument that Congress and the 
President may act on the basis of their own constitutional in-
terpretations constitutes a plea for doctrinal change rather 
than an argument squarely based on contemporary precedent. 
Even if Congress does not have the power to legislative on 
the basis of its own constitutional interpretations, one could 
still conclude that the Effects Clause explicitly gives Congress 
interpretive powers coextensive with the Supreme Court in the 
narrow context of full faith and credit. This argument does not 
directly run up against contemporary precedent, but no case 
law directly supports it, either. Instead, this argument is both 
novel and wholly sui generis to the full faith and credit context. 
For these reasons, the justification for Congress’s plenary Ef-
fects Clause powers provided above230 is a stronger argument 
for the Teamwork model in view of contemporary precedent. 
 
 224. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 225. See id. at 656 (upholding a statute banning literacy requirements for 
voting under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). The Katzenbach Court 
explained that even though the Court had upheld literacy requirements 
against an equal protection challenge in a recent case, Congress was free to 
legislate on the basis of the contrary view that such requirements were uncon-
stitutional and the Court would uphold Congress’s independent constitutional 
assessment as long as the Court could “perceive a basis upon which Congress 
might predicate [its] judgment.” Id. For present purposes, there is no need to 
review the cottage industry of scholarly approaches to interpreting Katzen-
bach—which involved such distinctions as ratchet-up and ratchet-down inter-
pretations—that arose following the decision’s publication.  
 226. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 527–28 (1997). 
 227. See Waldron, supra note 34, at 197–98. 
 228. See, e.g., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535–36. 
 229. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 649–51 (explaining the standard for de-
termining appropriate congressional legislation under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment). 
 230. See supra Part III.C.3. 
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D. ELABORATING THE TEAMWORK MODEL AND APPLYING IT TO 
DOMA 
Having generally described the Teamwork model and de-
fended it against a powerful objection in the two preceding sub-
sections, I will now elaborate the Teamwork model and apply it 
to DOMA. 
1. Elaboration 
In the absence of federal legislation, both federal and state 
courts231 can issue rulings on the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause’s requirements. Any such rulings have the status of fed-
eral common law.232 In the event that Congress enacts legisla-
tion under the Effects Clause, courts should undertake a two-
part analysis. First, courts should apply a clear statement rule 
to check that Congress engaged in a decision-making process 
that considered how full faith and credit’s competing considera-
tions should be harmonized in the context in which the statute 
is being applied. The italicized language merits elaboration. 
The harmonization process that attends full faith and credit de-
terminations invariably requires highly contextualized analysis 
because the extent to which state autonomy and national unity 
are implicated varies depending upon the substantive law or 
judgment at issue.233 The type of judicial test I propose, de-
signed to make certain that the political branches have forth-
rightly considered harmonizing the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause’s competing considerations in the context at hand, is ef-
fectively a rule of statutory interpretation requiring context 
specificity. 
Because Congress faces difficulty anticipating and consid-
ering the full range of substantive contexts, this standard of re-
view likely means that courts would have the first opportunity 
to reconcile the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s competing prin-
ciples, subject to congressional override. Though a bit clunky, 
this institutional arrangement seems wise. Courts are well 
suited to highly context-specific analysis that identifies the un-
derlying principles that particular fact patterns raise; this, in-
deed, is the core of common-law adjudication. Courts are less 
 
 231. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal 
Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 839–51 (2005) (illustrating state courts’ 
role in the formulation of federal common law). 
 232. See id. 
 233. See supra Part III.C.3. 
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institutionally suited than legislatures, however, to undertake 
the political, identity-defining reconciliation of the competing 
considerations. It is fine for courts to attempt an initial harmo-
nizing of competing considerations, but only if the politically 
accountable branches responsible for making political decisions 
have the power to legislatively correct judicial efforts.234 
If the statutory rule satisfies the first test, the court should 
then ask whether the rule is reasonable, taking into account 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s twin goals of creating a un-
ion and meaningfully empowering states. While such a “rea-
sonableness” inquiry is intrinsically open ended, some concrete 
guidelines do suggest themselves. To begin, a statutory provi-
sion that more-or-less embraces longstanding contemporary 
Supreme Court doctrine would seem to automatically qualify as 
reasonable. Similarly, a statutory provision adopting an ap-
proach that case law at one time reflected but later repudiated 
would be reasonable unless the later cases rejected the ap-
proach because of manifest error or gross injustice. This is true 
for two reasons. First, the mere fact that a majority of Supreme 
Court Justices championed the approach for some time is 
strong—though not dispositive—evidence that the approach is 
reasonable.235 Second, judicial rejection of an approach some-
times reflects the conclusion that courts’ institutional charac-
teristics rendered the approach judicially inadministrable, not 
a determination that the approach was substantially wrong-
headed.236 
These guidelines are useful but nonexhaustive. After all, 
there is no a priori reason why previous judicial approaches 
 
 234. Alternatively, Congress plausibly could delegate rule-making author-
ity to an administrative agency to harmonize the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause’s competing considerations across different contexts. This is a far infe-
rior approach to the institutional arrangement sketched above in the text for 
two reasons. First, an administrative agency likely would face the same prob-
lem as Congress: a limited ability to anticipate the varied contexts and care-
fully think through the relevant considerations without the detailed context 
that adjudications provide. Second, administrative agencies lack Congress’s 
authority and political accountability to make the political, identity-defining 
decisions reconciling the Full Faith and Credit Clause’s competing considera-
tions from context to context. 
 235. In my view, even a single Supreme Court Justice’s embrace of a par-
ticular approach in dissent would constitute significant evidence of reason-
ableness. 
 236. An example might be the Supreme Court’s approach to full faith and 
credit taken in Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 159–60 
(1932), which Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 413–14 (1955), effectively rejects. 
See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 110, at 163. 
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should limit the political branches’ legislative determinations 
under the Effects Clause. Where there is no ready judicial ana-
logue to the legislative determination, courts must directly 
query whether the balance struck between the principles of 
unification and meaningful empowerment is reasonable. 
2. Application 
This subsection considers DOMA’s applicability to a vari-
ety of acts and judgments. 
a. Public Acts and Declaratory Judgments 
Under the approach sketched above, DOMA’s choice-of-law 
provisions would readily pass constitutional muster as applied 
to the circumstances Congress drafted DOMA to address. With 
regard to the first test, DOMA satisfies the clear statement rule 
vis-à-vis the types of public acts and judgments that Congress 
considered during the course of DOMA’s debate: public acts de-
fining marriage and declaratory judgments that declare two 
gays to be married. To apply the second test, one must distin-
guish between public acts and judgments. For public acts, the 
DOMA rule tracks the ordinary full faith and credit doctrine 
and for that reason readily qualifies as “reasonable.” The 
analysis is only slightly more complex with respect to nonresi-
dents who marry in a state that legalizes same-sex marriage 
and then obtain a declaratory judgment reflecting their marital 
status. Although full faith and credit law typically mandates 
the enforcement of sister-state judgments, DOMA’s nonen-
forcement rule is similar to the exceptional cases that do not 
require enforcement of judgments on the theory that demand-
ing enforcement would constitute illicit extraterritorial regula-
tion by the state that issued the judgment.237 It readily follows 
that DOMA’s nonenforcement rule is reasonable as applied to 
declaratory judgments same-sex couples obtain for the purpose 
of circumventing home-state laws that do not authorize same-
sex marriage.238 
b. Insurance Judgments 
Next, consider DOMA’s application to a difficult hypotheti-
cal that Professor Koppelman formulates.239 Imagine a lawsuit 
 
 237. See supra Part II.C. 
 238. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 239. Koppelman, supra note 4, at 12–13. 
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in Massachusetts by the same-sex spouse of a worker whose in-
surance policy covers “spouses.” If the insurance company de-
clines coverage, a Massachusetts court might well decide that 
the couple indeed is married and that the company must pay. 
Armed with such a judgment, the prevailing plaintiff might 
seek to enforce it in another jurisdiction where the insurance 
company has assets. Because the judgment made an insurance 
company liable to pay “spousal” benefits due to the injury of a 
same-sex marriage partner, the insurance company might in-
voke DOMA to argue that state B need not enforce the judg-
ment insofar as it is the product of a “claim arising from” a 
same-sex relationship under DOMA language if state B does 
not recognize same-sex marriages.240 
Under my analysis, the insurance company cannot success-
fully invoke DOMA for two independent reasons. First, DOMA 
does not apply because Congress did not contemplate such an 
application during the course of DOMA’s debate and enact-
ment.241 Second, applying DOMA would not reflect a “reason-
able” harmonization of the principles of unification and state 
sovereignty. The forum’s interest in not enforcing the judgment 
is negligible. The domestic costs of enforcement are slight be-
cause courts, by virtue of their institutional role, enforce judg-
ments (and even apply laws) from other sovereigns all the 
time.242 Citizens consequently appear not to construe judicial 
enforcement as governmental endorsement of the legal right in 
question.243 Nor can one plausibly claim that nonenforcement 
would advance the forum’s interest in paternalistically regulat-
ing the same-sex couple, for the forum does not have a legiti-
mate interest in regulating nonresidents who simply seek en-
forcement of a judgment.244 Likewise, even if the insurance 
company resides in the forum state, the forum has no legiti-
 
 240. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). 
 241. See Koppelman, supra note 4, at 17 (reviewing DOMA’s legislative 
history and concluding that “[i]n writing the provision to cover judgments as 
well as choice-of-law decisions, Congress does not seem to have contemplated 
any genuinely adversarial proceeding” and that “the drafters of DOMA appear 
to have been blind to the statute’s effects on the targeted class” in the type of 
issues discussed in my example). 
 242. See Mark D. Rosen, Should “Un-American” Foreign Judgments Be En-
forced?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 783, 848 & n.283 (2004). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Moreover, it is hard to imagine in what way nonenforcement could 
qualify as paternalistic regulation even if the forum did have some regulatory 
interest. Can one seriously think that nonenforcement will lead couples to re-
visit their preferences regarding their partner’s gender? 
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mate interest in ensuring that its corporate citizen avoid claims 
connected to same-sex marriages that are legal in states where 
the insurance company has voluntarily agreed to do business 
and entered into contracts providing spousal benefits. By con-
trast, the costs to unification of refusing to recognize such a 
judgment are substantial. There is strong national interest in 
not creating a regime under which persons can dodge their 
judgment obligations simply by refusing to pay and crossing a 
state border.245 These various considerations justify interpret-
ing DOMA more narrowly than its plain language admittedly 
suggests. 
If courts were to adopt my conclusion that application of 
DOMA to the insurance company was not reasonable but reject 
the rule of statutory interpretation that constitutes the first 
step of my recommended analysis, it would not follow that 
DOMA is unconstitutional. This is so for two reasons. First, the 
Court could construe DOMA’s judgments provision narrowly to 
apply only to declaratory judgments in accordance with the 
canon of statutory interpretation that “where an otherwise ac-
ceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitu-
tional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid 
such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to 
the intent of Congress.”246 This narrowing interpretation of 
DOMA does not run afoul of Congress’s intent for the reason 
mentioned above: Congress did not consider DOMA’s applica-
tion to garden-variety judgments but instead focused on ensur-
ing that the nonadversarial declaratory judgments advised by 
gay rights advocates not be thought to bind other states.247 Sec-
ond, the Court could invoke the doctrine of severability and 
conclude that although DOMA’s application to adversarial 
judgments of the sort discussed above is unconstitutional, 
“other applications of the statute may be separated from the 
invalid applications and left in force.”248 
 
 245. See Rosen, supra note 115, at 883–91; Singer, supra note 7, at 20–22. 
 246. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988). 
 247. See Koppelman, supra note 4, at 17. 
 248. Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1951 
(1997). Vermeule helpfully notes that “[t]here is a common misconception that 
severability analysis refers only to the severance of provisions or subsections 
enumerated or labeled independently in the official text of the statute” and 
shows that severability analysis applies as well “to applications of a particular 
statutory provision when some (but not all) of those applications are unconsti-
tutional.” Id. at 1950 n.26. 
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c. Same-Sex Marriage Dissolutions 
Court orders in connection to the dissolution of a same-sex 
marriage, such as orders for spousal support, child support, or 
child visitation, present a far more difficult case. DOMA, under 
my analysis, does not address such court orders because Con-
gress did not consider these orders when it debated and en-
acted DOMA. If courts did not adopt this step of my analysis, or 
if Congress were to enact a follow-up to DOMA that explicitly 
applied to such orders (let us call this hypothetical enactment 
“DOMA-2”), we would have to directly confront whether a rule 
permitting states to refuse recognition of judgments in connec-
tion with the dissolution of a same-sex marriage is “reason-
able.” 
This is a very difficult question. In favor of enforcement, 
such judgments can arise—and such judgments invariably will 
arise now that same-sex marriage is legal in one state—in non-
collusive contexts. Moreover, the knowledge that state B will 
refuse to enforce postdivorce judgments in connection with 
same-sex marriages might seriously hamper a same-sex divor-
cee’s willingness to relocate to state B, and such obstacles to re-
location in turn may undermine one of the core benefits of the 
national union.249 Another trouble is that obligors from dis-
solved same-sex marriages may relocate to those states that do 
not enforce postdivorce judgments so as to effectively free 
themselves of their obligations, thereby harming the obligees 
who remain in the state in which the same-sex marriage oc-
curred.250 
On the other hand, requiring enforcement of such postdis-
solution judgments undeniably would constitute significant in-
terference with the forum state’s ability to regulate its citizens 
as it sees fit. It is important to remember that postdissolution 
judgments typically are not one-shot requirements to pay 
money or act in a certain manner, but instead regulate rela-
tions among the former spouses for a considerable time (for ex-
ample, until minor children reach the age of majority). Accord-
 
 249. Indeed, one readily can imagine the argument that such an obstacle 
itself constitutes a deprivation of the constitutional right to travel, though cur-
rent legal interpretations of the doctrine do not support such a claim. See 
Rosen, supra note 115, at 913–19 (offering a normative argument in support of 
the contemporary approach).  
 250. This might be an infrequent occurrence, for even obligors might be re-
luctant to relocate to a state whose policies do not accommodate their sexual 
preferences. 
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ingly, postdissolution judgments frequently require consider-
able judicial and executive branch involvement; officials regu-
larly modify orders, and police and other executive branch offi-
cials routinely intervene to address the high rates of 
noncompliance. Such governmental activity by the forum state 
is the functional equivalent of ongoing legal regulation. As 
such, if a same-sex divorcee resettles in a state that does not 
recognize same-sex marriage, requiring the new state to en-
force the former state’s judgment is tantamount to requiring 
the new home state to regulate its (new) citizen under another 
state’s law for the postdissolution judgment’s duration. This 
displaces the new home state’s ability to regulate its citizens in 
accordance with its public values; states design laws to encour-
age some behaviors and discourage others, signal values to citi-
zens, and socialize citizens, and requiring the new home state 
to enforce the former home state’s postdissolution judgment 
over an extended period of time undermines these ends.251 The 
former home state would in effect commandeer the new home 
state’s public policy and undermine the new home state’s abil-
ity to advance its social agenda. Indeed, these very real inter-
ests of the new home state are the reason that heterosexual 
postdivorce decrees are “nonfinal,” allowing the courts of the 
new home state to modify them in accordance with the law of 
the new home state.252 
In short, the effect that is to be given to judgments in con-
nection with the dissolution of same-sex marriages presents 
profoundly difficult policy questions that go to the heart of the 
character of our country’s federal union. Does the “unification” 
principle behind full faith and credit mean that states cannot 
burden a person’s ability to readily relocate by disregarding the 
legal rights that the person’s former home state created? Or 
does the “meaningful empowerment” principle behind full faith 
and credit mean that the new home state cannot be effectively 
forced to regulate its new citizen under the regulatory regime of 
the citizen’s former state? 
The answer cannot be arrived at through logic alone but 
instead reflects a political decision that will shape the identity 
 
 251. Durability distinguishes postdissolution judgments from ordinary 
judgments that enforce another polity’s law. The long-term character of post-
dissolution judgments transforms their enforcement into de facto displacement 
of the forum law. 
 252. See Worthley v. Worthley, 283 P.2d 19, 21 (Cal. 1955); SCOLES ET AL., 
supra note 110, at 676. 
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of our federal union. For that reason, the political branches of 
government bear the primary responsibility for answering the 
question. If Congress forthrightly considered the matter and in-
tentionally made a decision in a hypothetical DOMA-2 that 
states need not enforce postdissolution judgments, it would be 
hard to conclude that its decision, while difficult, was unrea-
sonable. Thus, a clear congressional decision in DOMA-2 au-
thorizing states to refuse to enforce judgments relating to the 
dissolution of same-sex marriages would not be unconstitu-
tional. As a practical matter, however, states that permit same-
sex marriage can significantly reduce the real-world costs of 
DOMA-2. Part IV discusses in detail how states can largely 
guaranty the enforcement of postdissolution judicial orders, ef-
fectively transforming DOMA-2 into a penalty-default rule.253 
IV.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE  
“PLACE OF CELEBRATION” RULE  
A. PROFESSOR SINGER’S ARGUMENT 
In a recent article, Professor Joseph Singer argued that 
DOMA is unconstitutional because full faith and credit requires 
that there be “a single answer to the question of whether a cou-
ple is or is not married” and that the answer must be supplied 
by the place of celebration.254 Even where a same-sex couple 
living in a jurisdiction that does not recognize same-sex mar-
riage (say Rhode Island) gets married in a state that grants 
same-sex marriage (say Massachusetts), Singer concludes that 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause demands that all other states 
treat the couple as married.255 Singer’s conclusion is predicated 
 
 253. For a general discussion of penalty default rules, see Ian Ayres & 
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 105–06 (1989). 
 254. See Singer, supra note 7, at 45–46. 
 255. Singer decides on the basis of traditional conflict of laws principles 
that the same-sex couple’s home jurisdiction (Rhode Island in the example in 
the text above) should treat the couple as being married in Rhode Island be-
cause they are legally married in Massachusetts. Id. at 30. He then provides 
several policy arguments supporting the proposition that marriage is a type of 
law that is “entitled to recognition by other states even if this allows . . . one 
state to export its law to the whole country.” Id. at 35. Singer’s constitutional 
argument does not explicitly address out-of-state same-sex couples traveling to 
Massachusetts simply to get married, but the policy needs he identifies are 
equally applicable to these couples as to couples who reside in Massachusetts. 
Indeed, when Professor Singer reviewed this manuscript and provided many 
helpful criticisms, he did not dispute the position attributed to him above. 
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on the assertion that there is a “need in an interstate system to 
have a single answer to the question of whether one is or is not 
married.”256 Otherwise, Singer argues, there will be a “problem 
of inconsistent legal obligations” in such matters as protecting 
offspring, allocating property interests, and sorting out other 
marital responsibilities.257 Such differences of legal obligations 
would permit a same-sex spouse to “evade [her] legal obliga-
tions under Massachusetts law” by relocating to a jurisdiction 
that refused to recognize judgments relating to same-sex mar-
riage.258 Let us call this the “obligation-evasion” problem. 
The issues Singer identifies are real, but the solution he of-
fers is deeply problematic for three reasons: first, Singer’s pro-
posal is contrary to the rule that has been in place for the en-
tirety of constitutional jurisprudence; second, there is precious 
little doctrinal basis for his novel solution; and finally, far less 
drastic means that are more protective of state interests can 
address the legitimate concerns that Singer raises.  
B. THREE CRITIQUES 
1. Contrary to Constitutional Jurisprudence 
To begin, Singer’s solution—creating a new constitutional 
rule requiring states to recognize the marriages that are valid 
in the place where the marriage was celebrated—is contrary to 
the constitutional rule that has been in place for our nation’s 
history. Courts and commentators at all times have understood 
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not obligate state B 
to recognize a marriage lawfully performed in state A.259 This is 
so despite the widely divergent marriage rules found in differ-
ent states at various times in our nation’s history. For instance, 
until the 1960s, some states prohibited interracial marriages, 
and when courts in such states were confronted with interracial 
marriages that had been performed in states where such mar-
riages were legal, the forum engaged in a nonconstitutional 
choice-of-law analysis to determine whether the interracial 
marriage should be recognized.260 The risks associated with 
 
 256. Id. at 36. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 6. 
 259. See Currie, supra note 61, at 10–11; Koppelman, supra note 4, at 10. 
 260. For a fascinating study examining how forum states with antimisce-
genation treated interracial marriages performed in states not barring misce-
genation, see Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and 
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creating “inconsistent legal obligations” for marriage were pre-
sent,261 yet the nation survived without the constitutional rule 
Singer propounds. To be clear, Singer acknowledges that his 
argument is difficult to “support based on historical interpreta-
tions of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”262 Important to any 
effort to assess the proposal’s desirability, however, is a full ap-
preciation of how drastically his proposal breaks with past 
practice. 
2. Analogizing Singer’s Approach to Williams v.  
North Carolina 
Second, there is little doctrinal basis for Singer’s radical 
proposal. The Supreme Court has held that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause does not require that a single state’s law apply to 
a particular transaction or occurrence (nor, a fortiori, does it 
provide any criteria for determining which state’s law appro-
priately applies).263 Rather, with respect to laws, the Court has 
folded full faith and credit into the due process doctrine that 
serves as a threshold test to insure that a state seeking to regu-
late has the constitutionally required minimum contact neces-
sary to legitimate its action.264 More specifically, the test is 
 
Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998). There of course would have been no 
state case law for Professor Koppelman to study if the place of celebration rule 
had been a constitutional requirement. Antimiscegenation laws were not ruled 
unconstitutional in America until 1967. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 
(1967) (holding that Virginia’s law prohibiting interracial marriages violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 261. Singer, supra note 7, at 36. 
 262.  Id. at 34.  
 263. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307, 308 n.10 (1981). This 
has not always been the case. For some time the Court understood full faith 
and credit as a doctrine determining which state’s law appropriately applied. 
See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 115, at 960–62 & n.447 (discussing Bradford Elec. 
Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 163 (1932) (Stone, J., concurring)); see also 
id. at 947 & n.392. More recent cases have narrowed Clapper to its facts. See 
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421–22 (1979); Rosen, supra note 115, at 961 & 
n.447 (reviewing the Nevada decision). I have championed a revival of Clap-
per’s approach, suggesting that the Full Faith and Credit Clause appropriately 
invites judicial scrutiny of whether state A’s interests pale in comparison to 
those of state B ’s such that state B ’s law must be applied. Rosen, supra note 
115, at 960. This method admittedly requires a “reworking of contemporary 
full faith and credit doctrine.” Id. It would not lead, however, to Singer’s pro-
posed solution that “place of celebration” alone determines which state’s law 
applies. Cf. id. at 934–41 (explaining why using a single factor to determine 
which law applies unduly imperils state interests and is unfair vis-à-vis par-
ties). 
 264. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 307–08. 
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whether the state that seeks to apply its law to a given transac-
tion or occurrence has a “significant contact . . . creating state 
interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor 
fundamentally unfair.”265 Notably, the full faith and credit in-
quiry does not compare which of several states has the greater 
interest in regulating but only proscribes regulation from states 
lacking the minimum contact.266 Accordingly, the full faith and 
credit question under contemporary doctrine is whether domi-
cile is a “significant contact” that creates interests on the part 
of a state (let us say Rhode Island) such that application of its 
marriage laws is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. 
The answer unquestionably is yes, for domicile long has been 
held to be a contact that justifies a state’s regulatory jurisdic-
tion.267 
Singer’s doctrinal argument primarily relies on the 1942 
case of Williams v. North Carolina.268 The Williams Court held 
that North Carolina was obligated to recognize a divorce issued 
by Nevada despite the fact that North Carolina had been the 
marital domicile, that the abandoned spouse still resided in 
North Carolina, that only one of the spouses had been present 
in Nevada (and the other spouse, in fact, had never been in Ne-
vada), and that Nevada law permitted divorce under circum-
stances that North Carolina (at the time) did not.269 As a purely 
doctrinal matter, Williams has never been understood to create 
Singer’s rule that all states are constitutionally required to rec-
ognize marriages valid in the place of celebration.270 Divorce 
decrees, unlike marriages, are court judgments, and the full 
faith and credit doctrine long has distinguished between judg-
ments and other “acts” of states.271 
 
 
 265. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting 
Allstate, 449 U.S. at 313). 
 266. See generally Rosen, supra note 115, at 960–61 (explaining that the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause limits the home state and host states alike). 
 267. See id. 
 268. 317 U.S. 287 (1942), vacated, 24 S.E.2d 256 (N.C. 1943). 
 269. See id. at 289–90, 303–04. 
 270. Indeed, the fact that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not man-
date recognizing marriages performed in another jurisdiction was the predi-
cate for one of Professor Koppelman’s constitutional challenges to DOMA, 
namely, that DOMA accomplished nothing and hence is irrational insofar as 
states were constitutionally permitted to decline recognition of other states’ 
marriages even before it was enacted. See Koppelman, supra note 4, at 10. 
 271. See supra Part II. 
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Singer’s proposal thus amounts to an argument for extend-
ing the Williams rule to marriages.272 This would be unfortu-
nate. Williams has been trenchantly critiqued since it was de-
cided,273 and for good reason. The Williams rule problematically 
diluted state sovereignty by giving states with the most lenient 
divorce laws the constitutional power to export their rules to 
more restrictive jurisdictions. Indeed, in the wake of the Wil-
liams ruling, “Nevada solidified its position as the nation’s 
leading capital of migratory divorce, shortening its residence 
requirements and expanding its grounds for divorce.”274 The 
Williams decision hence undermined the extent to which other 
states could efficaciously maintain stricter divorce laws that re-
flected their political community’s policy preferences, undercut-
ting federalism’s promise of permitting divergent policies and 
experimentation with substantive policies that are not them-
selves unconstitutional.275 Williams is unlikely to be overruled 
on account of its age, but its pernicious effects on state sover-
eignty and policy diversity constitute solid reasons to resist its 
extension. Furthermore, there is no policy basis for extending 
Williams because, as I’ll soon discuss, there are far less drastic 
mechanisms for solving the problems that motivate Singer’s so-
lution.  
Singer also relies on the dormant Commerce Clause’s “in-
ternal affairs” doctrine to support his claim that states should 
be constitutionally required to recognize same-sex marriages 
celebrated in jurisdictions permitting them.276 The internal af-
fairs doctrine is a federal choice-of-law rule tied to the dormant 
Commerce Clause; it makes law of the place of incorporation 
the operative rule on such matters as shareholder voting rights 
and the legal relations between shareholders and managers.277 
This dormant Commerce Clause rule, however, has no applica-
tion to family law. According to the Supreme Court, the inter-
nal affairs doctrine is applicable to “subjects that ‘are in their 
 
 272. See Singer, supra note 7, at 39–40 (“It would be odd if the Constitution 
required the several states to recognize Nevada divorces but allowed states to 
ignore Massachusetts marriages.”). 
 273. See, e.g., Williams, 317 U.S. at 304–07 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); 
Currie, supra note 61, at 9. 
 274. Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Over-
view of Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States During the 
Twentieth Century, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2017, 2039 (2000). 
 275. See Rosen, supra note 115, at 882–91. 
 276. See Singer, supra note 7, at 41–42. 
 277. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88–89 (1987). 
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nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of 
regulation.’”278 The internal affairs doctrine sensibly selects one 
state’s laws to govern shareholder voting rights because it 
would be unworkable if multiple states’ divergent voting-rights 
rules applied to a single corporation; each act of corporate gov-
ernance otherwise could be subject to inconsistent and mutu-
ally inconsistent state law requirements. Similarly, it would 
“threaten the free flow of interstate commerce”279 if each state 
were able to set maximum limits on train lengths, which is why 
the dormant Commerce Clause displaces these type of state 
laws as well. 
By contrast, the criteria for marriage do not belong to those 
“subjects that ‘are in their nature national, or admit only of one 
uniform system, or plan of regulation.’”280 On the contrary, it is 
in respect of such social policies about which citizens are deeply 
divided that preserving the possibility of diverse state regimes 
is most important.281 The mere fact that the marriage law se-
lected by a state may have effects on interstate commerce does 
not mean that the dormant Commerce Clause properly dis-
places the state law, for “‘there is a residuum of power in the 
state to make laws governing matters of local concern which 
nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or 
even, to some extent, regulate it.’”282 
3. Alternative Approaches 
Third, Singer exaggerates the novelty and dimensions of 
obligation evasion and overlooks far less intrusive solutions 
that can leave intact state prerogatives to differ substantively 
on matters about which the Constitution does not demand na-
tional uniformity. Less intrusive solutions are preferable be-
cause the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not appropriately 
used as a foil for diverse state policies not deemed unconstitu-
tional.283 
 
 278. Id. at 88–89 (quoting Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 
319 (1852)). 
 279. Rosen, supra note 115, at 929. 
 280. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 88–89 (quoting Cooley, 53 U.S. at 319). 
 281. See Rosen, supra note 115, at 929; see also id. at 886–91 (explaining 
the benefits of permitting different states to select different policies). 
 282. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981) (quoting 
S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 762 (1945)). For an excellent discussion of 
this idea, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 806 (2001). 
 283. See generally Rosen, supra note 115, at 882–91 (arguing that extrater-
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Singer’s analysis overstates the problem because family 
law has long been susceptible to attempts at “obligation eva-
sion” and the complex child support and property problems 
they create. In the context of heterosexual marriages, individu-
als (typically men) have married and had children in state B 
despite an existing marriage in state A.284 Sometimes the sec-
ond family is not discovered until after the man’s death, and 
the law must determine how the bigamous husband’s estate 
will be distributed. And in some cases, the man does not enter 
into a second marriage but carries on an adulterous relation-
ship that results in children. The law has devised solutions re-
garding child support and inheritance in such situations. These 
circumstances are not very different from the scenario Singer 
identifies of a gay spouse who tries to “skip out on [her] obliga-
tions” by abandoning her same-sex family and relocating to a 
jurisdiction that does not recognize same-sex marriages.285 The 
law’s solutions to these problems in the context of heterosexual 
marriage suggest that there are solutions in the same-sex mar-
riage context as well. 
The major difference between abandonment in the hetero-
sexual and homosexual marital contexts is that all states pro-
hibit successive heterosexual marriages (absent divorce, an-
nulment, or death), whereas states that do not recognize a 
same-sex marriage may not view a successive heterosexual 
marriage as bigamous.286 Singer’s proposed solution would 
eliminate this difference by constitutionally requiring all states 
to recognize a same-sex marriage performed in a jurisdiction 
allowing such marriages. But Singer’s approach does not per-
mit different states to have different policies on a matter in 
which the Constitution and other federal law do not (as of yet, 
at least) require national uniformity: same-sex marriage. 
 
ritorial regulation of citizens to curb “travel-evasion” of state policy is fair). 
 284. For a recent example, see State v. Fitzgerald, 726 P.2d 1344, 1345 
(Kan. 1986). 
 285. Singer, supra note 7, at 43. 
 286. States that do not recognize same-sex marriage could nonetheless 
treat as bigamous a heterosexual marriage that followed a same-sex marriage 
that had not been properly wound down, just as many states that prohibited 
interracial marriages elected to recognize such marriages that were performed 
in jurisdictions that permitted them. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Same 
Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921, 952–62 
(1998) (describing case law in which forums that prohibited interracial mar-
riage nonetheless recognized interracial marriages performed outside the ju-
risdiction). 
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Fortunately, there is another way to address obligation 
evasion without sacrificing state sovereignty and jeopardizing 
federalism’s benefits with regard to diversity across states 
among policies that are neither constitutionally required nor 
proscribed. Instead of demanding that all states treat same-sex 
marriages as valid marriages, the state that validates same-sex 
marriages unilaterally can ensure that a spouse who relocates 
to a jurisdiction that does not recognize same-sex marriage 
does not evade maritally created obligations. For example, 
states permitting same-sex marriages can criminalize the 
abandonment of spouses, the cessation of child support pay-
ments, and the like. Should abandonment or other criminal of-
fenses occur, the state accepting same-sex marriage can de-
mand extradition of the offending party. That state can then 
subject the evader to its laws and judicial procedures. 
This “extradition” solution works well both doctrinally and 
normatively. Doctrinally, it is well established that the asylum 
state (i.e., the state that does not recognize same-sex marriage) 
has no discretion to deny a valid extradition request issued by a 
sister state; there is no “public policy exception” with regard to 
extradition,287 nor must the alleged offense be criminal in the 
asylum state.288 This means that Massachusetts could validly 
prosecute the same-sex spouse who had fled Massachusetts, 
even if she is domiciled in a jurisdiction that does not recognize 
same-sex marriages. States have the power to criminally prose-
cute noncitizens’ out-of-state activities if those “[a]cts done out-
side a jurisdiction [are] intended to produce and produc[e] det-
rimental effects within it.”289 Individuals can be extradited for 
misdemeanors and for the failure to support minor children.290 
Moreover, it is well established that even if the act that com-
pletes the crime (such as celebration of the second marriage 
 
 287. See Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 227 (1987) (“We reaffirm 
the conclusion that the commands of the Extradition Clause are mandatory, 
and afford no discretion to the executive officers or courts of the asylum 
State.”). 
 288. Id. at 225 (upholding Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (22 How.) 66 
(1860), which “rejected the position . . . that the Extradition Clause required 
only the delivery of fugitives charged with acts which would be criminal by the 
law of the asylum State”). 
 289. See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911), discussed in Rosen, 
supra note 115, at 864–71 (showing that Strassheim’s rule has been incorpo-
rated into the Model Penal Code). 
 290. See Leslie W. Abramson, Extradition in America: Of Uniform Acts and 
Governmental Discretion, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 793, 822 (1981). 
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without having terminated the prior same-sex marriage) oc-
curred outside of the demanding state, the demanding state 
may still validly request extradition so long as some of the acts 
in relation to the crime occurred there.291 Plans to abandon 
one’s same-sex spouse—and perhaps even the same-sex mar-
riage itself—should satisfy this requirement.292 
To anticipate a likely objection, it does not matter that the 
activity completing the criminality occurred in a jurisdiction 
that does not criminalize the conduct. The Model Penal Code 
provides that a state can exercise legislative jurisdiction if the 
“actor purposely or knowingly caused the result within the 
State” even though “causing a particular result is an element of 
an offense and the result is caused by conduct occurring outside 
the State that would not constitute an offense if the result had 
occurred there.”293 Under this provision, Massachusetts can 
criminalize as bigamous a heterosexual marriage occurring in 
Rhode Island where one of the parties to the marriage previ-
ously entered into a same-sex marriage in Massachusetts that 
was not lawfully terminated prior to the Rhode Island mar-
riage. The Model Code provision means that Massachusetts can 
criminalize the conduct even if Rhode Island would not treat 
the Rhode Island marriage as bigamous because it does not 
 
 291. See Strassheim, 221 U.S. at 285 (“[T]he criminal need not do within 
the State every act necessary to complete the crime. If he does there an overt 
act which is and is intended to be a material step toward accomplishing the 
crime, and then absents himself from the State and does the rest elsewhere, 
he becomes a fugitive from justice, when the crime is complete, if not before. 
For all that is necessary to convert a criminal under the laws of a State into a 
fugitive from justice is that he should have left the State after having incurred 
guilt there, and his overt act becomes retrospectively guilty when the contem-
plated result ensues.” (citations omitted)). 
 292. Moreover, there may be no requirement that the defendant have un-
dertaken any acts in furtherance of her crime while she was in the demanding 
state or indeed that she ever have been in the demanding state. State regula-
tory jurisdiction extends to persons who undertake acts outside the state that 
are intended to have pernicious consequences in the state. See Rosen, supra 
note 115, at 880–81. If there is no such requirement, the mere fact that the 
person is outside of the jurisdiction she has harmed should qualify her as a 
“fugitive” for purposes of the federal statute that implements the Extradition 
Clause. See 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (2000) (requiring extradition of a “fugitive from 
justice”). Asylum states may statutorily adopt rules that permit extradition 
more readily than does federal law, and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act 
permits the extradition of persons who commit criminal acts in states where 
they were never physically present. See Abramson, supra note 290, at 828–29 
(noting this but suggesting that the Constitution does “not appear to” require 
extradition under such circumstances). 
 293. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(3) (1985). 
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recognize Massachusetts’s same-sex marriage as a valid mar-
riage. 
But would the extradition solution be available under 
DOMA? One might think that DOMA would free the executive 
in the asylum state from offering up a person whose crime re-
lates to obligations in connection to her same-sex marriage in 
another state. In fact, the executive’s obligation pursuant to the 
Extradition Clause would trump DOMA. The Supreme Court 
has construed the Extradition Clause’s charge that fugitives 
“shall . . . be delivered up” as creating a categorical duty on the 
part of the chief executive of the asylum state.294 In contrast to 
the Effects Clause, there is no language in the Extradition 
Clause granting Congress authority to provide an alternative to 
what the Supreme Court has said the Extradition Clause re-
quires. 
Even if the Full Faith and Credit Clause applied to execu-
tive orders under the Extradition Clause, empowering Con-
gress pursuant to the Effects Clause to determine the effect of 
such orders, Congress’s Effects Clause powers would not extend 
to eliminating the Extradition Clause’s categorical requirement 
that the asylum state comply with the demanding state’s ex-
tradition request. Congress lacks the power under the Effects 
Clause because deciding that executive orders need not be 
categorically respected would not be “reasonable”; there are 
significant benefits to the federal Union and virtually no costs 
to a categorical requirement giving effect to extradition orders. 
Conversely, there are significant costs and almost no benefits to 
a noncategorical rule. The benefit of the categorical extradition 
requirement is that it “preclude[s] any state from becoming a 
sanctuary for fugitives from justice of another state.”295 This 
smoothes relations among states and helps states enforce their 
laws. 
These benefits come at virtually no cost to the asylum state 
because, as the Supreme Court has noted, the extradition obli-
gation is merely ministerial in nature.296 The asylum state is 
not permitted to pass judgment on the wisdom of the demand-
ing state’s decision to criminalize a particular behavior but in-
stead must hand over fugitives solely for the purpose of 
strengthening the federal Union. Thus, the delivery of fugitives 
 
 294. See Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 224 n.3 (1987) (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2). 
 295. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 287 (1978). 
 296. See Branstad, 483 U.S. at 226. 
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cannot plausibly constitute the asylum state’s endorsement of 
the policy choices behind the demanding state’s criminal law. 
Further, the asylum state need do absolutely nothing beyond 
delivering the fugitive; prosecution, imprisonment, and so forth 
all are undertaken solely by the demanding state. As such, the 
asylum state’s compliance with the demanding state’s order 
does not compromise the asylum state’s ability to advance its 
public policies. This means that the asylum state has no valid 
interest in resisting the extradition order; the asylum state has 
no legitimate interest in interfering with other states’ lawful 
regulation of persons, even of the asylum state’s own citizens, if 
such persons act so as to trigger the demanding state’s regula-
tory jurisdiction.297 A noncategorical extradition obligation, by 
contrast, would interfere with the demanding state’s policies. A 
categorical extradition requirement thus brings benefits to both 
the asylum and demanding states, whereas a noncategorical 
requirement harms the demanding state without bringing cor-
responding benefits to the asylum state. 
Solving the evasion obligation problems Singer identifies 
by means of the Extradition Clause is normatively attractive 
for several reasons. First, the Extradition Clause has long been 
understood as the doctrinal vehicle designed to deal with the 
evasionary problem of persons seeking to escape obligations by 
crossing a state’s border. As the Court recently put it, the Ex-
tradition Clause is designed to “preclude any state from becom-
ing a sanctuary for fugitives from justice of another state.”298 
Second, the extradition solution permits the demanding state 
(i.e., the state that recognizes same-sex marriage) to defend its 
interests in protecting its citizens without unduly interfering 
with the asylum state’s policy preferences. There is a meaning-
ful difference between requiring the asylum state to deliver a 
fugitive to the demanding state and making same-sex mar-
riages valid nationwide. For the reasons discussed above, the 
asylum state’s delivery of fugitives does not constitute the asy-
lum state’s endorsement of the policy choices behind the de-
manding state’s criminal law. By contrast, Singer’s solution 
radically interferes with the asylum state’s ability to advance 
its vision of the good, for it displaces the asylum state’s sub-
stantive law when it mandates that all states recognize same-
sex marriages as valid. 
 
 297. For a discussion of the circumstances under which a state has a le-
gitimate interest in regulating a person, see Rosen, supra note 115, at 956–58. 
 298. Doran, 439 U.S. at 287. 
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It is true that the extradition solution does not solve all po-
tential problems of the sort Professor Singer identifies, but in-
completeness is not a reason to support Professor Singer’s pro-
posal. The extradition solution does not solve the problem of 
obligation evasion if the state that accepts same-sex marriage 
does not criminalize abandonment (or the other acts of obliga-
tion evasion) or if the state fails to conscientiously enforce those 
laws with extradition demands. Merely identifying a problem, 
however, does not mean that the appropriate solution comes 
from the Constitution. And that is the case here—a state’s fail-
ure to ensure the efficacy of its laws is a state political problem 
that is appropriately remedied by the state, not by federal con-
stitutional law.299 
The extradition solution also does not solve the problem of 
obligation evasion if the state accepting same-sex marriage is 
unable to locate the fleeing spouse who elects to remarry else-
where without informing authorities in her new state that she 
was previously married. This is not a consideration that weighs 
in favor of Professor Singer’s approach, however, because this 
danger would persist if his solution were adopted. After all, ob-
ligation-evasion problems remain in the context of heterosexual 
marriages that follow undissolved heterosexual marriages 
when the bigamous party does not make her prior marriage 
known to the second jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that 
all states would recognize the first marriage and treat the sec-
ond marriage as a bigamous union that hence is null and void. 
In any event, the state recognizing same-sex unions can seek to 
discourage such devious behavior by criminalizing it. For ex-
ample, Massachusetts can criminalize the failure of a Massa-
chusetts-married spouse to inform authorities and parties in 
another jurisdiction of her prior same-sex marriage. Another 
possibility would be for Massachusetts to require, upon pains of 
criminal liability, all same-sex spouses to notify the state of a 
pending marriage in another jurisdiction. 
Differences between a prior same-sex and a prior hetero-
sexual marriage admittedly may arise if the second marriage is 
discovered: both states will declare the second marriage null 
and void as bigamous in the latter context but not necessarily 
in the former.300 This distinction, however, is less significant 
 
 299. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2810 
(2005). 
 300. I say “not necessarily” because it is possible that the second state 
would give effect to a same-sex marriage celebrated in a jurisdiction that rec-
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than may at first appear. It likely would have little if any effect 
on child-support obligations, which states increasingly deter-
mine without regard to whether the parents were married.301 
Whether a child’s parents were married admittedly is relevant 
to inheritance in many states, though even the significance of 
this is diminishing, as “most if not all states” have enacted 
statutes that “permit an illegitimate child to inherit at least 
from its mother.”302 
In the end, the major distinction between the two cases 
(where the prior marriage is same-sex and where it was hetero-
sexual) is that whereas both states will declare void the hetero-
sexual marriage following a prior heterosexual marriage that 
was not properly terminated, the second marriage may be 
deemed valid in the state that does not accept same-sex mar-
riages while the first marriage may be deemed valid (and the 
second marriage invalid) in the state that accepts same-sex 
marriage. In short, each state may recognize as valid a differ-
ent marriage. 
Though this may seem odd at first, it is an acceptable by-
product of our federal system’s commitment to supporting di-
vergent state choices on matters in which the Constitution and 
other federal law do not mandate national uniformity. As I 
have demonstrated at length elsewhere, concurrent regulatory 
authority among multiple polities is the ordinary state of af-
fairs.303 As a result, a given transaction or occurrence is fre-
quently regulated simultaneously by more than one polity.304 
What is more, “regulatory authority is concurrent even when 
the states’ regulations substantively conflict,”305 and this is 
true for both civil and criminal regulation.306 The omnipresence 
of concurrent regulatory jurisdiction is a consequence of many 
transactions and occurrences having effects extending beyond 
the borders of a single polity. Thus, multiple polities have le-
gitimate interests. Federal law (both constitutional and statu-
tory) typically does not select one of the polities as having regu-
 
ognizes such marriages even though the second state itself does not permit 
such marriage. Cf. Koppelman, supra note 260, at 952–62 (showing that states 
that barred miscegenation nonetheless tended to recognize interracial mar-
riages celebrated in jurisdictions that permitted such unions). 
 301. See 41 AM. JUR. 2D Illegitimate Children § 90 (2005). 
 302. See id. § 120. 
 303. See Rosen, supra note 115, at 946–55. 
 304. See id. 
 305. Id. at 949. 
 306. See id. at 946–49 (civil); id. at 949–54 (criminal). 
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latory jurisdiction but instead acknowledges that the states’ 
have overlapping regulatory authority and leaves it to the 
states themselves—through the state law known as conflicts of 
law—to determine which among many potentially applicable 
state laws should apply in a given litigation.307 In fact, full faith 
and credit cases often observe that 
although the clause permitted the forum state to apply its law to the 
controversy, the nonforum state would have been free to apply its law 
to the self-same parties and occurrences had the lawsuit been filed 
there; this of course presumes that both states had regulatory powers 
over the parties and occurrence, and that the only question under full 
faith and credit was which state’s laws were to be applied by the par-
ticular court that was hearing the matter.308 
Viewed in this context, the prospect that two states may 
disagree about what constitutes a valid marriage is not terribly 
daunting. The disagreement reflects the fact that different po-
litical communities feel differently about what constitutes a 
valid marriage, and federalism’s commitments to political di-
versity suggest that such differences should be embraced, not 
undermined, until and unless it is properly decided that there 
ought to be a uniform national rule. If it seems odd that two 
persons may be married in the eyes of one state but not others, 
that may stem from an inchoate sense that marriage ought to 
be a matter of national uniformity. To date, however, American 
law pointedly has not adopted this position. 
To address another bogeyman, it frequently is argued that 
allowing some states to refuse recognition of same-sex marriage 
performed in Massachusetts would mean that the couple’s 
status would change depending upon what state border they 
happened to cross.309 This is not so. At all times, regardless of 
their physical location, Massachusetts recognizes their marital 
union and Rhode Island (let us say) does not. If an event occurs 
in another state that triggers a lawsuit—for example, an auto-
mobile accident in Rhode Island results in a lawsuit that raises 
the issue of potential recovery for loss of conjugal rights—the 
injured same-sex spouse can sue the defendant in Massachu-
setts. The Massachusetts court could decide under the choice-
of-law doctrine of depecage that Rhode Island tort law applies 
to the accident but that questions of family law for purposes of 
 
 307. See id. at 946–47 & n.391. 
 308. See id. at 946–47 (footnote omitted). 
 309. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 7, at 13–14. 
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damages are to be governed by Massachusetts law.310 If Massa-
chusetts does not have personal jurisdiction over the Rhode Is-
land defendant, the injured same-sex spouse would have to sue 
in Rhode Island and argue to the Rhode Island court that Mas-
sachusetts family should govern the question of whether she 
was married and hence eligible for certain marriage-related 
damages. Under this set of circumstances, Rhode Island’s re-
fusal under DOMA to recognize same-sex marriages would 
limit the same-sex spouse’s legal interests. These are real costs, 
but they are the costs of federalism’s respect for the preferences 
of different political communities. 
Even if the states may disagree as to whether a particular 
couple is married, each state may protect the parties it deems 
to be married. The same-sex spouse who left, say, Massachu-
setts to take up a new life elsewhere is still subject to Massa-
chusetts’s jurisdiction if she has left a spouse and/or dependent 
there. The mere fact that she is no longer present in Massachu-
setts does not put her beyond Massachusetts’s regulatory pow-
ers. Her same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, along with any 
spouse or dependents she left behind, give Massachusetts 
courts “continuing jurisdiction” and undoubtedly qualify as 
“significant contact[s]” that “creat[e] state interests, such that 
choice of [Massachusetts] law is neither arbitrary nor funda-
mentally unfair.”311 Massachusetts accordingly can prosecute 
her for bigamy, abandonment, and so forth because she has vio-
lated Massachusetts’s public policies, even if her new state of 
residence would not recognize the “second” marriage as biga-
mous. Similarly, a Massachusetts court would have continuing 
jurisdiction over her if her abandoned same-sex spouse were to 
sue in Massachusetts for divorce or other marriage-related rea-
sons. 
Complications would arise if the abandoning same-sex 
spouse were involved in a lawsuit in her new home state that 
could deplete the assets that would be available to support her 
abandoned Massachusetts family. Though most lawsuits would 
not pose problems unique to the same-sex marriage context—
the danger always exists for both heterosexual and same-sex 
families that a lawsuit in a foreign jurisdiction could lead to an 
impoverishing damages award—complications unique to same-
 
 310. See generally RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 3.4, at 94–101 (4th ed. 2001) (explaining depecage). 
 311. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)). 
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sex marriages occur with the legal dissolution of a subsequent 
heterosexual marriage. If the dissolution occurs outside of a ju-
risdiction that recognizes same-sex marriage, the question 
arises as to whether that jurisdiction will consider the financial 
obligation that the divorcing spouse already owes to her same-
sex family when the court calculates how property should be 
distributed, ongoing support obligations, and so forth. If the 
court does not take account of those obligations tied to the di-
vorcing spouse’s abandoned same-sex family, then inadequate 
funds may remain when a lawsuit for divorce and support for 
the same-sex family goes forward in Massachusetts. Massachu-
setts and individuals can alleviate this problem. Massachusetts 
can impose disclosure requirements that the commonwealth 
and the same-sex spouse be apprised of a pending lawsuit to 
dissolve a subsequent heterosexual marriage and criminalize 
the failure to disclose. The parties entering into a same-sex un-
ion in Massachusetts can contractually include a sue-first re-
quirement in Massachusetts, which other jurisdictions typically 
respect. 
While I cannot hope in the course of this Article to antici-
pate all possible outcomes that may arise as a result of states’ 
disagreement on what qualifies as a legitimate marriage, I do 
hope that I’ve shown that many of the problems can be obvi-
ated, or at the very least ameliorated, by states that recognize 
same-sex marriage. The problems that remain constitute the 
unavoidable costs of federalism’s commitment to diverse state 
policies on matters about which people strongly disagree but 
with respect to which neither the Constitution nor other federal 
law requires a uniform national rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The Lawrence decision did not render DOMA unconstitu-
tional. Lawrence equipped gay-rights activists with some favor-
able new constitutional principles, but it also embraced con-
cepts that opponents of same-sex marriage can apply toward 
their cause. The Lawrence Court participated in the ongoing 
national dialogue concerning gay rights, yet deliberately left 
undecided the constitutional status of same-sex marriage. This 
is a good thing, for allowing a wide-ranging societal debate on 
gay-rights issues to continue has many benefits, and there are 
numerous dangers to the Court prematurely ruling on issues 
about which citizens are deeply divided and with respect to 
which societal norms are in a state of considerable flux. Time 
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will tell whether Lawrence’s new principles will develop into 
doctrines that provide strong constitutional protections to gays 
and (perhaps) other disfavored groups, or whether these new 
principles ultimately will be limited to their facts. What is clear 
is that Lawrence did not render DOMA unconstitutional—at 
least not yet. 
Nor was DOMA unconstitutional before Lawrence was de-
cided. This Article has rebutted the many arguments that have 
been made by numerous scholars—including Dean Larry 
Kramer and Professors Laurence Tribe, Andy Koppelman, 
Stanley Cox, and Emily Sack—that DOMA exceeded Congress’s 
powers under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Several cri-
tiques of DOMA recur in the scholarly literature. Claims that 
DOMA violates state sovereignty by interfering with a family 
law subject that appropriately falls to the domain of the states 
are premised on a mischaracterization of DOMA: it does not 
regulate family law but serves the quintessentially federal 
function of determining the extraterritorial effect of state law. 
Arguments that DOMA undermines full faith and credit’s fun-
damental principle of unifying the country overlook the second 
animating principle behind full faith and credit—maintaining 
meaningfully empowering states—with which DOMA is fully 
consistent. Scholarly critiques of DOMA have assumed that it 
authorizes states to deviate from Supreme Court precedent re-
garding the enforcement of judgments, but this Article has 
demonstrated that DOMA actually fills a gap in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in a manner fully consistent with precedent. 
Even were this not so, DOMA would not be unconstitutional, 
because Congress has authority to legislate full faith and credit 
rules that vary from the Supreme Court’s. This analysis an-
swers several other scholarly critiques that boil down to the 
unargued assertion that the Supreme Court has the final say in 
determining what the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires. 
Finally, the Article has engaged Professor Singer’s novel 
argument that the Full Faith and Credit Clause demands that 
marriages sanctioned by one state be recognized by all. The 
Full Faith and Credit Clause should not be used to thwart dif-
ferences across constitutional, substantive state policies. The 
problems that Singer’s proposal attempts to counter can be ad-
dressed by alternative methods that do not intrude as radically 
in state sovereignty. Where the Constitution does not (yet, at 
least) demand a uniform national rule, diverse state policies 
should not be hindered by the Full Faith and Credit Clause.  
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In the end, DOMA is best understood as an example of 
congressional participation in the process of defining our coun-
try’s constitutional culture. The Court has not yet decided the 
constitutionality of same-sex marriage, and DOMA reflects the 
political branches’ contribution to the process of deciding how 
America should deal with the incidents of gay life. DOMA’s ac-
tual effects on constitutional culture remain to be seen: will it 
shape societal views, prompt angry opposition, or something 
else? Until the Supreme Court takes a definitive position, and 
perhaps even after, other societal actors are entitled to react to 
Congress’s views on same-sex marriage and thereby participate 
in the ongoing development of American constitutional culture. 
